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ABSTRACT
This thesis recommends a policy shift based on evidence
which shows that the United States could benefit from an
improvement in relations with India. The problematic US-
Indian relationship is traced from its inception in 1947.
Political, economic and strategic benefits available through
a policy shift are outlined. The most significant gain would
be in the strategic sense, with India as a dominant regional
actor maintaining regional peace and stability while keeping
trade and communications lanes open. A concomitant and almost
equally important benefit of such a policy shift would be the
added political prestige or influence for the United States,
especially within the Third and Non-Aligned Worlds. Finally,
India represents significant economic potential for US
investment and export. This study will also examine the risks





II. BACKGROUND FOR US INTERESTS TO 1980 3
III. THE WATERSHED: 1980 TO 1985 26
A. CHANGE BEGINS 30
IV. INDIA AND US ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 38
A. BACKGROUND 3 9
B. THE "RAJIV REVOLUTION" 4 5
V. US SECURITY AND THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 58
A. INDIA'S STRATEGY 60
A. THE INDIAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP 73
B. THE INDIAN-US RELATIONSHIP 77
C. INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1990S . . 84
VI. THE CASE FOR A US POLICY SHIFT 95




The US-Indian relationship challenges the imagination.
How could a pair more suited for cooperation or alliance be
so mired in mutual indifference or even distrust? A
reasonable explanation may exist for the chasm between the two
at various intervals of the post-war period, but that
explanation is no longer valid. While the cold war was at its
height, the American concern was primarily the containment of
its superpower rival; India's concern was to avoid alignment
with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Now the
focus is changing.
As it enters the 1990s, the post-war, bi-polar world is
experiencing shifts in its foundation. Whether US-Soviet
relations continue to improve or not, repercussions already
are felt from the apparent super-power thaw. The impact is
visible from the rumblings within NATO to the disruption of
ANZUS. The world is determined to progress to some new stage,
based not solely upon super-power nuclear deterrence but on
a system of regional security groupings, depending upon each
nation-state's individual choice. The Indian Ocean is one
such region.
It is my hypothesis that whether the US is a leader in the
new system will depend largely on American policy undertaken
today and in the near future. Within the Indian Ocean region,
the destiny of the United States will be determined by the
wisdom of its policy toward India. Even the built-in
advantage of a common political system has proven inadequate
for real US-Indian cooperation. This thesis examines the
reasons for this inadequacy. In Chapter I, the US-Indian
relationship is outlined from its inception to 1980. With a
view toward improving the US position within the future
framework of the Indian Ocean region, Chapter II reveals
evidence of the systemic shift occurring within the
international arena in the 1980s, particularly as these
changes affect India and its ties to the US. Chapters III,
IV and V detail the potential economic, strategic/military and
political risks and benefits inherent in a US policy shift
toward India. In summary, recommendations will be made for
the implementation of a successful policy shift.
II. BACKGROUND FOR US INTERESTS TO 1980
The United States and India each have traditionally
perceived the other as being only marginally within its
national interest. For the United States, the British
colonial territory seemed remote and inaccessible. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt made efforts to accelerate the process
of Indian independence, but most Americans remained ignorant
of the struggle taking place. For India, the United States
might have made a shining example of a successful former
British colony. The US WWII alliance with Great Britain,
however, tended to overshadow any positive impression which
might have been made by its potential model. The Indian
independence movement had been outraged in 1939 by Britain's
declaration of war on India's behalf.
Consequently, by the end of WWII, the US and India were
in no position to make overtures. Even when India emerged
independent in August 1947, the United States was otherwise
engrossed by post-war tension with the Soviet Union, over the
Allied occupations of Japan, Korea, Germany and Austria.
Furthering global democracy has been a stated US goal from the
">
?Truman to the Reagan Doctrine, but ideological aspiration
often takes a back seat to real-politik . Such was the case
as the United States remained largely indifferent to the
emergence of the great new democracy in 1947.
Another reason for the initial failure to establish a
close relationship was "the moralistic and self-righteous
criticism" of which both India and the United States were
guilty of directing against the other in those early years. 1
Each was fully convinced its path was correct, and
relentlessly tried to make the other see its wisdom. This set
a precedent for mutual indifference that would lead to
mistrust
.
India's first prime minister and founding father,
Jawaharlal Nehru, was firmly committed to a policy of non-
alignment. In his first official speech he stated his
intention to keep India "away from the power politics of
groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the
past to disasters." 2 As the architect of the Non-Aligned
Movement, along with Gamal Abdul Nasser and Josip Broz Tito,
xRichard F. Nyrop, ed., India: A Country Study (Delhi:
Vikas Publications, 1970), p. 34.
2G. S. Bhargava, South Asian Security After Afghanistan
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 11.
Nehru "realized that polarization of intraregional conflicts
between the superpowers was the surest way of perpetuating
them, thereby reducing the regional states to dependencies of
outside powers." 3 Nehru, writing from prison in 1944,
recognized that the Soviet Union "already ... is showing an
expansionist tendency . . . there have been revealing glimpses
(of the Soviet Union's postwar intentions) . It aims at having
as many friendly and dependent or semidependent countries near
its borders as possible." 4 Later, writing his autobiography,
Nehru expressed admiration for the "courage" and "capacity for
sacrifice" of communists, although,
"I am very far from being a communist. I dislike
dogmatism and the treatment of Karl Marx's writings or any
other books as scripture which cannot be challenged. ..
I
dislike also much that has happened in Russia ... It is
difficult to be patient with many communists; they have
developed a peculiar method of irritating others . . .
Coming back to India, communism and socialism seem a far




Nehru did prefer socialism as an economic system for his
country, although India has maintained a mix of the socialist
3G . S . Bhargava , South Asian Security After Afghani stan
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983)
, p. 11.
4Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Garden City,
New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 398-399.
5Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press,
1958), pp. 348-350 (emphasis added).
and capitalist systems. Nehru's ties to Western society were
much stronger than any with the Soviet Union. His British
education, practice as an English barrister and close
friendship with such persons as Lord Mountbatten were
countered by his hatred of British colonial dominance of
India. Thus his personal feelings seemed to parallel his non-
aligned, or balanced policy as well.
With the death of Stalin in March of 1953, the Indo-Soviet
relationship began in earnest. Up to this point, relations
had been characterized by Stalin's "utter indifference,
accompanied by hostile posture." 6 Under Stalin the Soviet
Union did not even publicly note the proclamation of Indian
independence. Once India emerged as a full member of the
Commonwealth, Stalin saw it as a victim of imperialism with
a bourgeoisie government. When India "registered a strong
protest" against the UN's decision (made by military command)
to extend the Korean War north of the 38th parallel, some
internal Soviet change of attitude may have occurred, but was
6
J. A. Naik, Soviet Policy Toward India (Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1970), p. 34.
not expressed (India had supported the initial UN General
Assembly resolution condemning North Korean aggression). 7
During the period from Stalin's death in 1953 to Nehru's
death in 1964, several developments of staggering global
importance also had major impact on India. First was the rise
to power of Nikita Khrushchev, who propelled the Soviet Union
dramatically into the Third World. Khrushchev "placed a high
priority on developing close relations with India as a
prestigious and presumably socialist new nation." 8
In December 1953 the Soviet Union and India signed a five-
year trade agreement, which was based on rupee payments, thus
reducing foreign exchange problems for India. Of particular
note is that this agreement preceded the Indian-Chinese Treaty
of Peaceful Coexistence by a year.
Early in 1954 the US began unilaterally arming Pakistan
in an effort to build an arc which would contain the Sino-
Soviet monolith. In September 1954 Pakistan joined the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and in the following year
the Baghdad Pact, anticommunist organizations which
7Timothy George, et al
.
, Security in Southern Asia (The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 74.
"William Dunbar, India in Transition (Beverly Hills:
SAGE Publications, 1976), p. 65.
"intensified. . .Nehru' s suspicious attitude toward the
West. . . (since it) brought the cold war to South Asia (and) . .
.
also meant the arming of India's major adversary." 9 It was
Pakistan's minister of defense, Ayub Khan, who astutely
"involved first the US and then China in the internecine
problems of the subcontinent, thus driving India to move
closer to the Soviet Union." 10 Ayub Khan was personally
responsible for obtaining US aid under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement of 1954. Although "the wisdom of giving
arms to Pakistan . . . was severely questioned by many
Americans, including Ambassador Chester Bowles," 11 "in an age
of simpler perceptions . . . Pakistan was on the side of the
good guys." 12 Pakistan readily dropped its previously non-
aligned stance in favor of US aid. When Ayub Khan imposed
martial law and declared himself dictator, Pakistan was
irreversibly dependent on US aid.
'Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Union and South Asia:
Moscow and New Delhi Standing Together, " in Andrze j Korbonski
and Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union in the Third World
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 212-213.
10G. S. Bhargava, p. 11.
nW. Norman Brown, p. 4 00.
12M. J. Akbar, p. 95.
The US policy of containment was first outlined by George
Kennan. When it was interpreted and redefined as NSC-68, it
was implemented by government officials such as Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles. The well-known personal antipathy
between Dulles and Indian Defense Minister Krishna Menon was
exacerbated by the US insistence on affixing either a
communist or non-communist label on foreign relations.
India's firm commitment to non-alignment was seen by the US
as an unwillingness to defend democracy or weakness in the
face of the perceived communist threat. Dulles considered it
cowardly and immoral. Menon and Dulles clashed as two strong
and vocal leaders. Menon and India resented the US insistence
on adhering to its policy of containment; India considered
itself fully capable of fashioning its own foreign policy.
The Dulles-Menon feud is typical of US-Indian relations in
general, as each tends to resent the other's high-handedness
in offering advice.
As superpower demarcations became clearer, the People's
Republic of China also became embroiled in the subcontinent.
In April 1954, the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet was signed,
based on the Panca Sila , or Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence (one of which stated each would refrain from
interfering in the internal affairs of the other) . Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai visited Delhi in June 1954, and both he and
Nehru "restated their Governments' adherence to the five
principles." 13 During this time India was acting as a
"forceful advocate" for admitting the PRC to the UN, with
Nehru as an "ardent spokesman" for what he thought of as a
true friend. 14 Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai promised to "use only
peaceful methods" to resolve the border issue, a dispute that
India did not openly acknowledge. 15 Nehru's obstinacy would
lead India into a humiliating military defeat, from which
Nehru would personally never recover.
In February 1955 an Indo-Soviet Steel Agreement was
reached, providing for a one-million ton capacity steel plant
to be built at Bhilai, India. In April the Bandung Conference
of Afro-Asian states was held, at which Nehru, as one of its
most distinguished sponsors, continued to press for China's
inclusion in the international system. In June Nehru made a
visit to the Soviet Union, culminating in a joint communique
issued by Nehru and Premier Nikolai Bulganin, which committed
each to adhere to the five principles. While Western actors
"Timothy George, et al
. ,
p. 75.
"Ibid, pp. 104, 77.
"Neville Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970), p. 82.
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generally dismiss such declarations of principles, India
(especially Nehru) took this quite seriously, hoping "this
type of formal agreement might militate in favor of a more
orderly and responsible pattern of international behavior by
the Soviet Union." When Bulganin and Khrushchev visited
India later that year the "vociferous anti-Western tenor of
(their) speeches . . .proved personally embarrassing for Nehru . " 1€
The next year, 1956, was one of further antagonism between
India and the West. After the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt,
India "made no secret of its dismay that its partner (England)
in the Commonwealth should be reverting to colonial practices
in the Middle East." 17 The Soviet invasion of Hungary,
however, failed to elicit any strong condemnation from India,
although Nehru "did indicate his concern when the results of
(the Indian Ambassador in Moscow's) investigation became
available." 18
The following year, 1957, brought more difficulties as the
US and the UK sponsored a resolution in the UN that would
place a temporary peace-keeping force in Kashmir and hold an
17
;Ibid, p. 76.
Vera M. Dean, New Patterns of Democracy in India
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 169.
18Ibid, p. 179.
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internationally-supervised plebescite. This resolution was
openly supportive of Pakistan's position. The USSR's counter-
proposal was rejected, and eventually the Soviet Union used
its veto to cancel the whole thing. In New Delhi, "it was
widely held that the West had provoked the Soviet veto to
embarrass India." 19
In 1959 the PRC's policies of repression in Tibet began
to dampen the apparent India-China are of good will. The US
State Department righteously "accused China of barbarous
intervention" and of attempting to "destroy the historical
autonomy of the Tibetan people." 20 Even the Soviet Union
"showed sympathy for Indian sensitivities" over the "harsh
manner in which the Chinese put down the Tibetan revolt and
drove the Dalai Lama into India." 21 India received the Dalai
Lama as a refugee, and Sino-Indian relations seriously
deteriorated.
Khrushchev made a second visit to India in 1960, the year
of the critical rift in Sino-Soviet relations. As the Soviets
19Timothy George, et al, p. 81.
20DuPre Jones, ed., China
:
US Policy Since 1945
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 120.
21Lucien W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1984), pp. 250-251.
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began to pull advisors out of China and end its aid, India
made its first major purchase of Soviet military equipment.
Thus began the defense relationship regarded so unfavorably
by the United States and its allies, as well as by China and
Pakistan. In 1962 India, "in response to Pakistan's
acquisition of the supersonic F-104 and to heightening
tensions in China," made an agreement with the Soviets for the
purchase and local production of the MiG-21. 22 A possible
additional reason for beginning the Indo-Soviet defense
relationship was "a continuing belief (in India) that visible
military links with the Soviet Union might serve as a check
on Chinese intentions." 23
Relations between India and the PRC worsened as disputes
over the border erupted in war in 1962. Most international
opinion was critical of the PRC which easily and rapidly won
the skirmish. India's defeat was "a cruel blow to its
prestige and self-esteem" after which Nehru admitted being
disillusioned. 24 The US State Department was "shocked at the
violent and aggressive action of the Chinese Communists
22Leo R. Wollemburg, What's in it for India? (National War
College, Strategic Studies Report, 1985), pp. 21-22.
"Timothy George, et al, p. 81.
24Richard F. Nyrop, ed., pp. 77-78.
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against India," and, along with Great Britain, France and
Canada, responded forthright to an Indian plea for aid. 25 This
instance of the US perceiving the Chinese threat to India is,
however, one of the few times that US and Indian threat
perceptions have coincided.
A tangential result of the border war was the political
downfall of V.K. Krishna Menon. He had proved to be an actor
of enormous impact on the Indian scene. Early on he served
as head of the India League in the fight for independence.
Later, as India's representative to the U.N. and then Defense
Minister, Menon continued to show his antipathy for the US and
approval of socialism and the USSR. He was even suggested in
1959 to be "the principal threat to India's democracy." 26
Still, he and Nehru remained close friends and co-proponents
of India's non-aligned posture (although Nehru's version was
not tilted toward the USSR). Nehru's sister, Krisha,
described Menon as an intense, eccentric and prudish person. 27
Menon came to believe that the USSR would restrain China even
as the border tensions mounted in the early 1960s. While he
25DuPre Jones, ed., p. 132.
26Vera M. Dean, p. 98
.
27Krisha Nehru Hutheesing, We Nehrus (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 71.
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is commonly blamed for leading India into a humiliating
defeat, his premonition was not necessarily without
foundation. The Soviets may not have assumed their pro-China
stance if the Cuban missile crisis had not intervened, an
event Menon and Nehru could not have foreseen. Nehru removed
Menon from the Defense Ministry, and eventually from the
cabinet entirely, although he did so only after fruitless
resistance to enormous pressure against his friend. 28 Menon'
s
fall from grace saved Nehru some political injury, but nothing
could restore the Prime Minister to his former level of
idealistic activism.
It was shortly after this critical juncture that Nehru
died. India and the world lost a leader of great vision who,
though admittedly idealistic, guided India through turbulent
times in a manner thoroughly grounded in the Indian national
interest. Lai Bahadir Shastri would fill in as Prime Minister
from 1964 until his death early in 1966.
Indira Gandhi's rule from 1966 to 1984 (except 1977-79)
naturally was heavily influenced by her father and his life.
A 1927 family visit to the Soviet Union impressed Nehru and
28John Rowland, A History of Sino-Indian Relations
(Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Col, Inc., 1967), p.
170.
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his wife, Kamala, in a very positive way. Jawaharlal imposed
advanced readings upon a young Indira, particularly those
stressing the benefits of socialism. This may explain her
willingness to sign a treaty with the USSR, a move that, while
expedient in 1971, may have permanently compromised India's
non-aligned status. 29 Her leadership firmly and openly
challenged the US, especially on the war in South East Asia.
Indira was less committed to liberal democracy than her
father, Nehru, as evidenced by her autocratic imposition of
the Emergency in 1975. Although a dedicated patriot, Indira
was also an astute politician who nevertheless may ultimately
have done injury to the country she undoubtedly cherished.
She would leave India continuing to face violent communal
rifts. Without benefit of its previously unchallenged non-
aligned status, India became more seriously tied to the USSR
than ever before or since.
The Soviet Union also experienced a change in leadership
which would result in a shift in policy toward India. Among
other failures, Brezhnev charged Khrushchev with having "over-
committed the Soviet Union with India" in the Sino-Indian war
at a time when the PRC should have been "cultivated rather
29Dom F. Moraes, Indira Gandhi (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1980), pp. 45, 187.
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than further antagonized." 30 When Brezhnev and Kosygin
accepted the basic hostility of the PRC, they modified
Khrushchev's India policy by asserting friendship with both
India and Pakistan.
Meanwhile "US military aid not only provided security but
also enabled Pakistan to challenge Indian control of
Kashmir." 31 The ancient dispute over this territory, the
gateway to India, led India and Pakistan to war in 1965 in
which the Pakistani strategy of internationalizing a regional
conflict was used. Seizing the initiative, Pakistan gained
control of some Kashmir territory and then referred the matter
to the UN, requesting a cease-fire line that would grant
Pakistan the territory seized. India, however, retook the
territory before the UN cease-fire, which eventually left the
border as it had been before the war. One affect of the war
was to "solidify .. .the military supply relationship (of India
and thg_USSR) . . .after the US embargoed military sales to both
Pakistan and India." 32 This inconsistent character of US
30
J. A. Naik, p. 135
William Dunbar, p. 65.
Leo R. Wollemburg, p. 22
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military aid deepened India's conviction that the US could not
be depended upon as a source for arms
.
Although it "fell to the USSR mainly by Western default," 33
the Tashkent Summit of 1966 was a diplomatic coup for the
Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Kosygin mediated between Indian
Prime Minister Shastri and Pakistan's General Ayub Khan f and
helped usher in stability which, while not permanent, was
still a remarkable accomplishment. The United States was
legitimately preoccupied with the war in Vietnam; still, the
neglect of India while the Soviets exercised diplomacy served
to further estrange the United States from the region and its
dominant actor.
The year 1965 produced a new warmth in relations between
the USSR and Pakistan. When he made the first state visit
between the two countries, Ayub Khan "found that even the US
base at Peshawar did not preclude improvement in relations
with Moscow." 34 The Soviet "policy of improving relations with
Pakistan .. .was pursued irrespective of the Indian reaction to
such a posture." Kosygin even visited Pakistan in 1968, the
33Rasul B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers (New
Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), p. 122.
34William Dunbar, p. 67.
35J. A. Naik, p. 137.
18
first visit to that country by a Soviet Premier. Economic
issistance was offered in the form of a large metallurgical
plant in West Pakistan and an atomic power station in East
Pakistan, and finally even military equipment was supplied.
Another indication of the Soviet policy shift was the non-
inclusion of India in the first post-Khrushchev Soviet
proposal in 1968 for a summit conference on the Middle East
crisis (India had long stressed relations with Middle East
countries, both to placate its own large Muslim population and
to maintain its ties with the non-aligned world) . The Soviet
Union seemed to have decided to rely on economic rather than
political ties to sustain relations with India. 36
What forced the USSR to revert back to an "India first"
type of policy was the threat posed by a US-Chinese
rapprochement. The US used Ayub Khan to set up the first
Kissinger visit to China. After relations with China were
established, both India and Pakistan became even less
important to the US. President Nixon and Secretary of State
Kissinger were convinced that, to a certain extent, they could
now contain the Soviets by "playing the China card". Then,
;Ibid, pp. 139-142
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too, in 1965 the PRC agreed for the first time to supply
Pakistan militarily. 31 The USSR naturally looked then to India
for further help in containing China. The threat in 1971 of
a subcontinental war made these shifts clear.
Pakistan had, since independence, battled a unique set of
problems, one of which could only be resolved by a war of
secession. Pakistan's founding father, Ali Jinnah, was intent
on securing the most possible land for his new nation; the
result was a country whose two halves were separated by 1,000
miles. East Pakistan held the majority of the population and
national income, but West Pakistan had nearly all the power.
A series of military dictators ruling from West Pakistan
resulted in the East Pakistanis feeling angry at their lack
of representation. Language and, to some extent, religion
also separated the two polities. A December 1970 election
produced a clear victor, Mujib Rahman, for East Pakistan, but
Bhutto won in the West and refused to share power with Mujib.
The incumbent dictator in the West, Yahya Khan, still
controlled the military. He sent troops into East Pakistan
and by March 1971, "it was ... obvious that a particularly
'Ibid
20
brutal civil war was raging." Others considered the war to
be "unqualified immorality" by a government against its own
people . 39
At this point the United States was "preoccupied with
their initiation of a new relationship with China", and thus
felt compelled to support Pakistan. 40 Military and political
support from the US was sustained throughout the conflict even
though this meant "supporting genocide, military incompetence
and recklessness in incurring international shame." 41
By August, India stood firmly in support of Bangladesh's
independence. The United States and China clearly supported
Pakistan; thus India felt compelled to at least ensure Soviet
neutrality, and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation. Comparing the treaty with others made between
the USSR and the Third World shows that India is "less
closely. . .tied to the USSR than is any other signatory." 42 The
38Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Pakistan; A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: American University, 1984), p. 56.
3
*W. Norman Brown, p. 415.
40Richard F. Nyrop, ed., pp. 490-491.
41W. Norman Brown, op.cit., p. 415.
42Department of State Report 190-AR, "Soviet-Third World
Treaties Since 1971: Similarities and Contrasts" (August
1981), p. 2.
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treaty does not obligate either to defend the other, but
merely to "abstain from providing any assistance to any third
party that engages in armed conflict with (sic) other Party." 43
The treaty generally addresses the peace-loving attitudes of
each, and establishes economic and cultural relations.
In the United States, Kissinger had "exploited. .
.
(Indira
Gandhi's) reputation as a crafty politician. . .to present India
in a lurid light and justify US policies in South Asia." 44 The
Department of State even questioned whether India "might use
as a pretext the Pakistan counterattacks in the west to annex
territory in West Pakistan." 45 In November 1971, Indira Gandhi
travelled to Washington to meet with President Nixon, but
little mutual understanding was achieved. When war was
formally declared between India and Pakistan, the United States
continued its pro-Pakistan stance while the Soviet Union
exercised its UN veto to support India.
In December 1971 Indira Gandhi recognized the Provisional
Government of Bangladesh and sent Indian forces into the area.
Even at this point, when India's actions seemed quite clearly
43Ibid, Annex B-3 (Article 9;
44G. S. Bhargava, p. 119.
4 5Department of State Bulletin (January 17, 1972), p. 69
22
supportive of a bonafide national liberation movement, US
Representative George Bush proposed to the UN that both sides
withdraw their forces from the border, while recognizing that
"a fundamental political accommodation still has not been
achieved in East Pakistan." 46 Pakistan was successful in its
strategy of "trying to reduce (the Bangladesh independence
movement) to an Indo-Pakistan dispute, and then
internationalize it." 47 India did achieve political
accommodation, though, as Pakistan was forced to surrender
within two weeks, and Bangladesh was liberated. Meanwhile,
the US had sent the aircraft carrier Enterprise into the Bay
of Bengal, and "for the first time... the US was regarded as
a major security threat by India." 48
Thus by 1972 the cold war had come to South Asia with a
vengeance. President Nixon visited communist China in 1972,
a journey made possible in part by Ayub Khan. Brezhnev was
"forced... to abandon certain positions in Asia... and thus to
accept a loss in prestige and credibility, especially in
"Department of State Bulletin (December 27, 1971), p
722.
47G. S. Bhargava, p. 120.
"Richard F. Nyrop, ed., p. 492.
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India." 49 Still, the "Soviet Union regard (ed) India as a
valuable asset in its competition with China"/ since India was
at that point at odds with the United States, the Indo-Soviet
relationship continued. 50
Then "in 1975 ... renewed US arms shipments to Pakistan
underlined the threat to India from the Washington-Islamabad-
Beijing axis." 51 Still India "sought to maintain its
independence" through, among other actions and policies, the
possibility of improved relations with the PRC. India has
pursued improved Chinese despite the emotional response this
has elicited from Moscow, especially since 1979. 52
From 1947 to 1979, then, the US and India seemed at cross
purposes, with national interests unlikely to coincide in
spite of the common element of democracy. The reasons for the
faltering relationship can be summarized as initial
disinterest exacerbated by competing national pride; personal
antagonisms, such as that between John F. Dulles and Krishna
Menon, or President Nixon and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi;
the US policy of containment, with positive results for those
^William Dunbar, p. 68.
50Ibid.
"Robert C. Horn, p. 214.
"Ibid.
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willing to sign on, like Pakistan, and retribution for those
that wished to remain non-aligned; a perceived and somewhat
genuine lack of US national interest in India, except as
concerns that promotion of democracy; and, US absorption with
containment of communism, North East Asia, the occupation of
Japan, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
The 1980s has been a decade of enormous impact to the
international system, however, and this watershed has not
failed to affect the US-Indian relationship.
/
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III. THE WATERSHED: 1980 TO 1985
The 1980s has been a decade of extremely important change
within the international system. Several previously inactive
or developing nations have emerged as major actors with
predominance over their region. India rapidly advanced
technologically, economically and militarily so that today it
commands regional and global respect.
The international system also felt the brunt of several
major events between 1980 and 1985. These included the
resurgence of the cold war, the US-Chinese rapprochement, the
emergence of Islamic fundamentalism with the ensuing
revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan with subsequent withdrawal under terms similar to
the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and finally, the warming
of superpower relations with attendant arms control
agreements. This chapter examines the events of the first
half of the decade, their impact on India, and on US-Indian
relations
.
The US presidential campaign of 1980 was characterized on
the Republican side by Ronald Reagan's emphasis on the "Evil
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Empire". As he took office early in 1981, President Reagan
fulfilled campaign promises to rebuild the American defense
forces in response to the perception of an increased Soviet
threat. The first four years of the Reagan administration saw
no lessening in anti-Soviet rhetoric, and little improvement
in superpower relations. As superpower tension increases,
countries aligned with or dependent on the United States or
the USSR feel reverberations in the form of increased military
aid and, often, political pressure. India and Pakistan
exemplify this phenomenon.
The Indo-Sino-Soviet-US tangle was thrown a new curve as
the United States and the PRC established relations in 1979.
The Soviet Union naturally looked again to India as a
counterbalance to this new friendship. No formal alliance
came of the US-Chinese warming trend, but at the beginning of
the decade the Soviets saw reason to feel threatened. Since
India had previously suffered US neglect as the United States
pursued a Chinese link, India, to some lesser extent, also
viewed the US-Chinese relationship with apprehension.
India, Pakistan and the United States all were affected
by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When this
aggression failed to provoke a statement of condemnation from
India, many in the United States were quick to label India as
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a Soviet "client-state" or even "ally". This was a critical,
if typical, error in judgement. India hesitated because of
domestic conditions, rather than any sympathy for Soviet
policy. After losing the 1977 election and leaving office,
Indira Gandhi had returned to power in July of 1979,
politically weakened by the legacy of her imposition of the
Emergency of 1975-1977. The Congress Party's political hold
had fallen from an overwhelming majority to only 43%. In June
1980 Indira's son and presumed heir, Sanjay, was killed in a
plane crash. Rajiv was elected to fill his brother's seat in
Parliament, but many states had already begun electing
opposition governments. Friction between the central and
state governments increased continuously from 1979 to 1984.
Indira maintained her hold by using an authoritarian style,
often blaming the US CIA for internal dissent, a claim the
Soviets could be counted on to support.
Because of her weak political position, then, Indira was
unwilling in 1980 to condemn the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Having the friendship of at least one superpower
was critical to her continued political success.
Still, India would not condone the Soviet invasion, thus
clinging tenuously to claims of non-alignment. The US
decision to begin rearming Pakistan in 1980 evoked criticism
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from India. The massive, $3.2 billion aid package approved
that year and the US policy of smuggling arms to the Afghan
rebels through Pakistan were highly provocative to India.
Problematic US-Indian relations have been blamed, in the
United States, on internal Indian problems or Soviet aid, but
"a more fundamental cause was America's insistence on propping
up the Zia regime in Pakistan militarily, economically and
politically." 53
India's willingness to remain neutral on the Afghan
situation made the Soviets "willing to pay heavily for Indian
good will." 54 The Soviet arms deal made with India in 1980 was
a $2.5 billion package. The Soviet percentage of India's
trade had expanded from .15% in 1953 to 9.2% in 1979. 55 Indeed
Soviet assistance "has been crucial" since "95-99% of Soviet
aid has been channeled toward India's public sector", helping
build its industrial base and ultimately reach its goal of
self-sufficiency. 56 For India to openly criticize the Soviet
"Asia Yearbook 1988 , pp. 141-142.
54Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment
of the Third World (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1986),
p. 59.
55Leo R. Wollemburg, p. 18.
56Ibid, p. 19.
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Union in 1980 would have meant endangering this economic and
defense lifeline while no alternative was being offered.
These four factors, then, contributed to the early 1980s
Pakistan-US versus Indian-Soviet alignment:
1) Indira Gandhi's weak political position;
2) the 1980 US rearming of Pakistan;
3) the 1980 Soviet aid package to India and the need for
India to maintain the Soviet supply line; and,
4) the revival of the cold war as President Reagan
denounced the "Evil Empire".
A. CHANGE BEGINS
Since then, however, a shift in attitude on both sides has
become ever more apparent. The 1980 coalescence of Indian and
Soviet mutual need was the high point ; since then a broadening
of views on both sides has occurred. The improvement in
superpower relations and Indo-Pakistani relations, the Soviet
shift toward the PRC and the withdrawal from Afghanistan all
resulted in decreased Indo-Soviet inter-reliance.
One indication of this shift is the attention given to
India by the Soviet media (an instrument of Soviet government
policy) , as recorded by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. In 1979 the Soviet media was recorded as addressing
diplomatic relations with India on fourteen occasions. In
1980 the number skyrocketed to seventy-six . But in 1981 it
o
was back down to twenty-two, and in 1982 to eighteen. The
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lower trend continues until 1985 and 1986, when the numbers
were thirty-eight and sixty-seven, respectively. This later
increase is probably due, however, to Gorbachev's more open
and clever political style. 57
Another indication of less close relations was that India
was dropped from the "warm" category of Soviet May Day
greetings in 1981 and 1982, to the "fraternal" category in
1983 through 1985 ("fraternal" being the lowest category,
"warm" the medium and "ardent" the greetings reserved for the
USSR's closest friends). 58
As in the mid 1960s, the shift in relations this time is
again due in part to changes in leadership. For the Soviet
Union, "Andropov's early emphasis after succeeding Brezhnev
in late 1982 was on domestic reform, and he did not at first
devote much emphasis to Third World subjects." 59 In India, the
assassination of Indira Gandhi in October 1984 brought her
son, Rajiv, to power. Rajiv is an engineer with a pro-Western
orientation, who has made economic and technological progress
the number one priority for India. Unlike his brother,
"Foreign Broadcast Information Service, USSR, 1979 to
1986.
"Francis Fukuyama, p. 85.
59Ibid, p. 18
31
Sanjay, Rajiv did not seek his political heritage, but
accepted it as a duty. Rajiv had not been influential, as had
Sanjay, in his mother's imposition of the Emergency of 1975.
Rajiv's emphasis on modernization is echoed throughout the
Third World. Developing countries have shifted their agendas
as decolonialization becomes less of an issue and economic
development takes precedence over political questions. This
has resulted in increasing criticism of the Soviet Union "from
even their most loyal clients for failing to meet needs other
than those related to arms and security." 60 Since the United
States "displaced the Soviet Union as India's number one trade
Va^t- - - —
partner in 1984", India's economic ties to the West areSo ;
increasingly making the USSR less attractive. 61
Even though India and the USSR have maintained economic
and defense ties, on "several significant issues ... India has
consistently refused to bow to Soviet pressure." 62 One of
these issues was the idea of an Asian Collective Security
System, first circulated by Brezhnev in 1969. Each time this
system has been suggested, including in 1982, India has firmly
60Ibid, p. 78.
"Robert C. Horn, p. 212
62Leo R. Wollemburg, p. 27
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refused. India suspected that plans for Soviet hegemony in
the subcontinent were behind the scheme.
India has also consistently denied the Soviets basing
rights in India. The Soviets have made port visits, but the
US Navy also made its first port visit in a number of years
in 1984.
India has never been totally dependent on the Soviet Union
? \ for defense needs. From 1967 to 1985 India made somewhat less
than 20% of foreign purchases of military hardware from
Western or non-Soviet sources. 63 The 1980s move toward more
significant diversification is discussed in Chapter IV.
A fourth issue in which the Soviet Union could not
influence India concerns the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
of 1978. Although Pakistan has made public statements
declaring its willingness to sign the Treaty if India would,
so long as the PRC has nuclear weapons India is not likely to
4^
sign on. Because of strategic threat perception, and because
nuclear capability signifies major/great power status, India
insists on keeping the nuclear option open. Both India and





The India Ocean Zone of Peace concept is widely touted by
Moscow as an example of its peaceful intentions, but this
issue, too, divides India from the Soviet Union. Like the
United States, the Soviets envision a Zone of Peace maintained
through a balance of power among littoral states. India,
however, has regional hegemony in its national sights and is
unlikely to settle for less. Finally, on the issue of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India has each year abstained
from the vote to condemn the USSR. While Westerners may see
this as knuckling under to Soviet pressure, if the Soviets had
sufficient influence, India would vote against the UN
resolution. That India agreed with the Soviet analysis of the
original situation, which blamed the Afghanistan problem on
"some outside power", is again because Indira Gandhi was at
that point politically vulnerable, and making such claims of
outside interference herself. One month after the invasion,
Foreign Minister Gromyko traveled to New Delhi to try to
obtain Indian endorsement, but he failed. In 1980 the Indian
External Affairs Minister was sent to Moscow to try to get the
Soviets to pledge a withdrawal, complete with timetable; he,
too, failed. The "pattern for meetings ... in which... both
sides ... refuse to budge" on the issue continues, and Rajiv
Gandhi has been forthright in pointing out publicly that the
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issue has been discussed "at some length", saying that India's
policy of not condoning interference in another country's
affairs continues unabated. 64
From 1950 to 1970 the superpowers both were sensitive to
the massive size and potential power of the PRC; each tried
to "play the China card" against the other. Then the Sino-
American entente of the 1970s seemed to shift the weight of
the PRC to the Western side. In the 1980s, another shift is
apparently under way, as the PRC astutely plays the "China
card", improving relations but keeping its distance from both
the United States and the USSR. The superpowers are not the
only ones courting the Chinese. India has sought improved
relations with the PRC since the 1962 border war. When the
Chinese invaded Vietnam, Kosygin warned India that "China
might want to teach India a lesson ... as .. .with Vietnam:;
still, "India's interest in pursuing normalization with
China. . .despite Kosygin' s impassioned performance, remained
unchanged. " 65
In October 1983, China agreed for the first time to
consider India's proposal for a sector-by-sector approach to
"Robert C. Horn, p. 218.
"Robert C. Horn, p. 216.
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the border dispute. Trade relations were resumed in 1979, and
in September 1984 a new trade agreement was signed. Rajiv
Gandhi met personally in New York with Premier Zhao Ziyang in
1985, and border talks have reached the eighth round.
Perhaps the single most significant area in terms of a
shift in India's policy has been the increasing importance of
high technology, especially as concerns defense, but also in
the economic sphere. In the defense arena this demand for
higher technology has been augmented by the desire to
diversify its defense supply line. The new emphasis on
technological development has been proclaimed India's number
one priority since late 1984, when Rajiv Gandhi took office.
More critical than India's purchase of other Western
equipment is the new defense relationship with the United
States, discussed at length in Chapter V.
The events from 1979 to 1984 coalesced to subtly alter the
rigid, bi-polar superpower cold war. Power now lies not only
in the hands of two nations, but in several. Economic
success, military build up and potential nuclear weapons
capability have allowed additional members in what was
previously a two-nation club. The second half of the 1980s
saw the results of these movements. US policy makers have
been prudent in responding to the apparent shifts under way.
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In at least one area, South Asia, opportunity exists for the
United States to simultaneously enhance its own status as well
as stability within the region.
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IV. INDIA AND US ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
Heretofore this thesis is concerned primarily with
politics, diplomacy and security. In proposing to make
suggestions for improvements in US-Indian relations, it is
equally essential to note the concomitant economic development
and potential of India. In strictly economic terms, India
represents a vast, mostly untapped market and potentially
lucrative ground for massive joint ventures. Most of India's
economic potential remains unacknowledged by US businesses.
One reason for this is the persistent, negative images most
Americans have of India. Unfortunately stereotypes exert
lasting influence. Another reason is the overly optimistic
view that the Western world persisted in holding toward China
for the past 150 years. The China market has, since 1950,
been substantially less productive and poorer than that of
India. By the year 2025 India's population will surpass that
of the PRC, which is expected to stabilize at about 1.2
billion. These factors, with the "Rajiv Revolution", indicate
an opportunity for US investors and exporters alike. Closer
US-Indian relations, achieved through the policy shift
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recommended by this author, would encourage US businesses,
hesitant so far, to penetrate deeper into the Indian
market
.
Economic relations would in turn strengthen the ties that
could make US-Indian cooperation a reality. In terms of risk,
increased economic relations carry a lower potential risk than
change in either the political or security spheres. This
chapter assesses the Indian economy as it developed from
independence to 1984, and as it looks as 1990 approaches.
A. BACKGROUND
The British had been in possession of India since the
early 1700s. Under the auspices of a charter to the East
India Trading Company, Great Britain constructed a political
and economic system that provided the foundation of the
British empire.
Indian nationalism and economic discontent finally
coalesced to produce independence from the British in 1947.
The British system provided a political and industrial
infrastructure that allowed a relatively smooth transition to
Indian leadership. The transportation system and heavy
industry left by the British proved beneficial to building a
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new nation. Still, the nation was left with several
impediments to growth, including a huge agricultural sector
with production stagnant at low levels, and a heavy-industry
sector that was small but still larger than that of other
recently independent countries. The commodity-dominated
export trade had poor growth prospects, and the large
transport system lacked feeder lines (efficient for colonial
control but not conducive to broad-based growth) . The
administrative structure was designed for centralized
(British) rule and lacked the training, experience and depth
for broad-based development. Perhaps most debilitating was
the vast initial level of landless poor that could not be
absorbed in industry.
Faced with this intimidating array of short-comings, new
Indian leadership developed a strategy based on increased
growth through capital goods. The First Five-Year Plan of
1951 emphasized agriculture, which improved through 1955, due
mostly to weather conditions. Planners were convinced it was
time to shift the emphasis. The Mahalanobis Plan would show
limited short-run benefits to India's poor, because of its
heavy reliance on industry. Agricultural investment, it was
known, would only detract from investment in capital goods.
From 1950 to 1965, the Third Five Year Plan, mostly a
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refinement of the Second, was impressive in its success: GNP
grew at a rate of over four percent per year; although the
lower 40 percent of the population experienced no per capital
income growth, the upper 60 percent averaged a 2.3 percent
annual growth rate; irrigation and labor use improvements
resulted in agricultural output of 2.8 percent, while
industrial output grew at an average of seven percent each
year. 66
Rather than continued growth, the ten years from 1965 to
1975 brought a harsh awakening. Emphasis on industry had made
the country vulnerable to a decline in foreign food aid. From
1960 to 1965, industrial employment grew at a six percent
rate; industrial production grew at 8.9 percent. At the same
time, agricultural production was down 2.1 percent. The
resulting increase in demand had to be met with foreign
supplies. Then came the worst drought in recorded history.
The 1965-66 season was a disaster, followed by another bad






The 1965 drought brought a steep decline in demand for
capital goods. At the same time, foreign aid begin to decline
from $1.3 billion in 1965 to $120 million in 1972, putting
recovery from the drought off to the mid 1970s.
In the mid 1970s, foreign aid began to rise again,
approaching half of the 1965 level. A new strategy emerged,
with agriculture at its core. Industrial growth would be
encouraged not only by domestic investment but by exports and
domestic consumption. A less centrally controlled, more
public investment-encouraged, market-oriented growth pattern
was pursued, although significant government control was
exercised until 1984.
Throughout these years of early nationhood, a major factor
in low growth and unemployment was India's deliberate neglect
of foreign trade, and consequent inability to compete with
exports. The little that was exported to eastern bloc
countries was of the traditional commodity composition. India
has consistently pursued high levels of protectionism and a
policy of import substitution. This attempt to exclude
foreign economic influence is quite understandable,
considering Great Britain's previous exploitation and
manipulation; the policy, however, has had the most negative
impact on India itself.
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From 1970 to 1980, a slight shift was noticeable, away
from anti-colonial socialism and toward a more rational, less
controlled capitalism. Sheer size of population may prevent
India from ever achieving a truly capitalist, free-enterprise
state. Still, any trend in that direction must be viewed as
a positive step.
With a population approaching one billion, India naturally
relies heavily on agriculture. About 70 percent of the
population still earns its living in the agricultural sector,
accounting for 40 percent of GNP (which is down from 50
percent in I960). 68 Improvements in fertilizers, irrigation,
storage and distribution have helped India make some
impressive gains, especially in foodgrain production.
Monsoons, however, still wreak havoc on crops, although the
impact is diminishing with technological advances. Overall,
government policy since the mid-1960s has been highly
supportive of agriculture, allowing the impressive achievement
of food-grain self-sufficiency.
While the agricultural sector has flourished, though, the
industrial sector has grown at consistently lower rates than




industrial growth is India's continual failure to provide
reliable electrical power. Possible cause for optimism may
be India's nuclear program. By far the most encouraging sign
is the growth in domestic oil production, which now accounts
for two thirds of domestic consumption.
During the late 1970s, India ushered in some important
policy changes. One of these, arguably the most important,
was an annually more liberalized import policy, beginning with
1978. €9 This movement was still counter-balanced through 1985
by a tightly controlled, centrally planned economy. Import
policy is based on the Imports and Exports Act of 1947,
augmented by the Import Order of 1955 (a list of controlled
articles) . Any product on the Import Order list will enter
India under one of four categories: 1) Open General License-
-foreign exchange is made available for payment and no special
license is necessary; 2) Limited Permissible—items can be
imported only by actual users and only up to a certain level;
3) Restricted—items can be imported only to be used in a
product which will then be exported; and 4) Banned. Licenses
for categories 1) through 3) are tightly controlled by the
central government's Chief Controller of Imports and Exports.
'Ibid, p. 7
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Nearly all goods that can be manufactured in sufficient
quantity in India fall under category 4), Banned.
India is a member of GATT, the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs, but, as a Less Developed Country, GATT allows
India to exercise import restrictions to promote domestic
economic development. A sign of India's improved economic
status in 1989 is the likely inclusion of India in the US
Super 301 "hit list", a compilation of countries that have
erected systematic barriers to US exporters. The list may
also include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil. 70
B. THE "RAJIV REVOLUTION"
India's economy changed dramatically as a result of the
political succession of Indira Gandhi by her son, Rajiv, in
1984. His approach to economic matters was seen immediately
to differ greatly from Indira's. His reform program, which
makes economic growth and technological modernization India's
number one priority, has been dubbed the "Rajiv Revolution."
Under Rajiv's program, improvements toward liberalization
have included greater freedom of operation for the private
70Nayan Chanda, "US Raises the Stakes," Far East Economic
Review (Hong Kong: 20 April 1989), p. 44.
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sector, elimination of production limits and delicensing in
some important industries, anti-monopoly legislation,
improving private access to capital markets and others.
Beginning in 1985, the usual year-to-year plan was exchanged
for a three-year plan, which should provide a more stable plan
for growth.
Another important area of change is in export policy. The
1985 three-year plan included special privileges for export
manufacturers, allowing easy import of capital goods and raw
material under the Duty Exemption Scheme. Even more recent
is the Import-Export Pass Book Scheme, another that allows
for duty-free imports which are necessary inputs to exports;
this is more broad in scope than the Duty Exemption Scheme,
eliminating procedural delays
.
The results of implementing this policy can be seen in
Direction of Trade Statistics. India's exports for November
1984 equalled $453.3 million; for September 1987 the level
jumped to $1,030.2 million. Imports for the same periods were
$1,278.9 million and $1,434.7 million, respectively. 71
India's balance of payment status through 1985 indicates
that current accounts have been on a down slide since 1978,
71Direction of Trade Statistics, 1987
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reaching a minus 4,157 million SDRs (Special Drawing Rights,
the monetary unit of the International Monetary Fund) in 1986.
However, the level of Direct Investment and Other Long-Term
Capital has increased from 553 million SDRs in 1978 to 3,301
million in 1985. 72 The dismal performance on current accounts
is due to India's import/export restrictions and failure to
fully participate in the world economy. The upward trend in
investment is in keeping with the Sixth Plan (1980-81 through
1984-85) , developed by the Indian National Development
Council. The Seventh Plan calls for a "decrease in investment
expenditures allocated to the public sector—only 47 percent
in contrast to over 57 percent in the Third through Sixth
Plans". This indicates confidence in the private sector's
investment potential. 73
The exchange rate of rupees per U.S. dollar has nearly
doubled from 7.93 in 1980 to 13.101 in 1987. 74 The largest
increase, from 7.93 to 12.451, occurred between 1980 and 1984.
Since 1984 the exchange rate has fluctuated up or down in very
small increments. During the span from 1980 to 1987, U.S.
72Balance of Payments, 1985 .
"Overseas Business Report , p. 6.
74International Financial Statistics
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liabilities to India went from $442 million to $1,187 million,
while U.S. claims on India grew more slowly, from $211 million
to $494 million. Consumer prices are on a steady increase,
but again the years from 1980 to 1984 saw the largest jump. 75
These statistics indicate that the Seventh Plan is providing
a more stable pattern of investment and spending, with a
leveling off of the exchange rate and cost of
living/inflation
.
Aside from several specific areas for concern, the most
crucial factor in India's economy continues to be the
government's role. Historically, Indian civilization relied
heavily on a central authority for moral and other guidance;
the relatively benign experience as a British colony did
little to alter that dependence. Today it is accepted that
a central authority should plan and implement, among other
things, the nation's economy. Accordingly, it has retained
tight control over the nation's purse strings. The result is
a inability to adjust to a fluctuating world market. Further
problems stem from over-protectionism, leaving India's
manufacturers unable to compete with exports. This leads to
75Ibid
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a policy of import substitution, creating, on the up side, a
diverse and mostly self-sufficient base.
Taken from another perspective, government leadership can
be seen as quite positive. The government has managed to
convert the economy to one with a diversified industrial
structure. Resultant short-run slow growth appeared negative,
but has provided for long-term flexibility. Admittedly the
poverty level has remained high, but successes have spilt over
to that sector in the form of lower death rates and increased
education and health care. 76 Then, too, India's enormous
resource base has been deliberately underdeveloped until India
can create its own institutional capacity for successful
exploration/exploitation. Another area of rapid build up has
been the science and technology complex, third in size among
today ^s nations. 77
The overriding element which has driven every facet of
Indian society since 1947 has been the desire for self-
sufficiency. In every area India has chosen to refuse foreign
aid rather than bow to foreign domination (which has since
1968 excluded it from U.S. aid). This has forced it to
76John W. Mellor, op. cit
. ,
p. 7
77 Ibid, p. 3.
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develop its own resources at a rapid rate while accepting that
it cannot keep up with highly industrialized nations.
Selective import of technology is now allowed in cases where
"the lead time required to develop it indigenously would
entail delays in executing important development programs". 78
Still, the impetus for allowing this foreign intrusion is to
achieve eventual self-sufficiency.
US-Indian trade remains an area dramatically
underdeveloped (along with Indian foreign trade in general)
.
Two-way trade has grown from $1.5 billion 1978 to over $4
billion in 1984, 79 but "U.S. firms . . . view India as a
difficult country in which to conduct business". 80 The
faltering relationship is mirrored in the political arena, and
is equally frustrating in both areas. Although the Indian
market has in the past been tightly controlled against foreign
products, services and investment, the Indian market of today
takes a more rational approach to economics.
Domestic industry and import licensing have been
liberalized while also opening the Indian market very





selectively—mostly to allow in Western technology. The
willingness to move away from physical controls in favor of
allowing market forces more influence, as evidenced in the
Seventh Plan Document of 1986, is an important indicator.
Rajiv Gandhi dismissed V.P. Singh as finance minister, whose
plan for maturation would have required many years in office
to see through. Still, Rajiv seems determined to carry out
the plan. Singh's removal was probably due in part to
pressure from the "larger and more powerful socialist lobby
that thrives on the public economy", a system which Singh was
determined to change. 81
That large public sector has been referred to as India's
"dinosaur legacy". Rajiv "jolted" a rally of Congress Party
workers in December 1987 with the question, "Can we afford a
socialism where the public sector, instead of generating
wealth, is robbing and sucking up the wealth of the people?" 82
The 17.3 million public employees are a spoiled and
recalcitrant group. Still, without it, "it is doubtful that
...India could have developed from a colonially exploited
plantation economy into a substantially self-reliant and well-
81Jean A. Bernard, op. cit., p. 426
"Lincoln Kaye, "India's Dinosaur Legacy," Far East




diversified industrial power in such a short time." The basic
problem is the "paradox of state-run industries in a
pluralistic democracy like India, " in which "social control
of the economy. .. (can) translate into political control". 83
Gandhi and his cabinet are considering some truly radical
alternatives to the public sector problem, but will have to
tread carefully for fear of destroying themselves politically.
Another internal source of considerable distress is the
40% of India's population (some 320 million people) that lives
below the poverty line. India refused to resort to a truly
socialist redistribution of wealth to rapidly solve the
problem (like the PRC did) . The first through third five-year
plans emphasized a capital good growth scheme, which the
planners accepted would not yield great benefits to the poor.
A disastrous drought in 1966-1967 denied the opportunity to
shift gains made through capital goods to the agricultural
sector, through which 70% of the population make their living.
Then the oil shocks of the ^70s set back recovery again; today
India is close to being self-sufficient in oil. The worst
drought of the century hit in 1987, but its impact was offset
by India having achieved self-sufficiency in foodgrain
83Ibid, pp. 56-59
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production, with fairly large reserves. 84 Some indicators show
great improvements in the standard of living (i.e., literacy
rate, life-expectancy) , but the poverty is still overwhelming
in its numbers and depth. Because of the strong fatalistic
nature of Indians, most are content to allow the government
to stimulate growth by sectors; thus poverty should not be
allowed to overshadow the enormous gains made and potential
for future improvements.
The often-cited Indian poverty level is countered by
India's enormous, thriving middle class. Most Americans would
be shocked to hear that up to 100 million Indians are now
"changing the face of India . ""Production of consumer durables
has risen 60% over the past three years in response to this
"huge and relatively untapped market." Many credit the new
consumerism in India to the attitude of Rajiv Gandhi, who
urges his fellow Indians to improve their standard of living
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The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) was established in July 1983, comprising India,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives.
Although initially not a substantively productive
organization, SAARC is currently seen as potentially
effective, particularly in terms of economic cooperation. 87
Difficulties between India and Nepal over bilateral trade
arose in March 1989 as treaties governing trade and transit
rights lapsed. In the economic as well as the military
sphere, India hold most of the cards. Nepal will most likely
back down in this case. India is unwilling to allow Nepal to
grow independent on China; already Nepal has purchased Chinese
anti-aircraft guns. Nepal is allowed to import arms "with
Indian assistance and agreement, " according to the two
nations' 1950 agreement. 88 The trade friction is illustrative
of India's intent to maintain an economic hold over the South
Asia region, particularly as it will allow pursuit of national
security objectives.
87Salamat Ali, "A hint of hope," Far East Economic Review
(12 January 1989), p. 11.
89Salamat Ali, "A matter of time," Far East Economic
Review (4 May 1989), p. 24.
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A second trade issue arising in 1989 is the Soviet Union's
new desire for some form of currency convertibility. Indo-
Soviet trade might contract severely, the debt service ratio
might fluctuate or the rupee exchange rate could suffer as a
result. Some Indian economists are nervous at the prospect,
but others are "sceptical of Moscow's ability to move too fast
in the direction of a *hard' rouble." 89 Still, if the rouble
became convertible and devalued by 50%, the Soviet Union could
drop from second place among India's trading partners (after
the United States), to fourth or even fifth. 90 Soviet
perestroika may further weaken the Indo-Soviet relationship.
In January 1989, Indian Defense Minister Krishan Chander
Pant announced a reversal in India's policy of banning arms
exports. He specified that "the decision to export arms will
be guided by our foreign policy perceptions." Certainly this
move will increase India' s activity within the international
system, and perhaps its political status as well. This
"competitive challenge to China" may ultimately be a key to
89Lincoln Kaye, "Moscow's hardline hint," Far East
Economic Review (13 April 1989), p. 49.
90Ibid.
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boosting the Indian economy into the top five or six
globally. 91
While the massive potential of India's enormous resources,
coupled with the significant shift in economic policy, makes
for a decidedly optimistic view, a "South Korean or Brazilian
^miracle' is not likely in India." Those miracles took place
under "bureaucratic-authoritarian" models of development
(which exclude labor from decision-making) , while India is a
"nationalist-reformist" type in which "policy shifts can be
best be incremental." Rajiv Gandhi can be credited with
significant progress in this area, especially in allowing the
import of technology. Still, democratic nations probably have
to settle for slower growth. The "values of ... (Mahatma)
Gandhi and Nehru . . . cannot and should not be abandoned in the
name of economic liberalization, efficiency and production." 92
Rajiv Gandhi's revolutionary program has met resistance
from some concerned about those values. The prospect of
facing a national election, however, ensured a partial return
to a more socialistic type of economy. The budget presented
91Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly , January 1989.
92Eddie J. Girdner, "Economic Liberalization in India,"
Asian
Survey , Vol XXVII, No. 11 (November 1987), pp. 1188-1204
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to parliament in February 1989 was an "election document,"
full of "giveaway" social programs, and, even though GNP is
growing at 11% this year, the new budget is noticeably lacking
in added taxation. 93 Still, success at the polls in December
1989 (if achieved) will allow Rajiv at least five more years
to implement his revolution. If India can meet the challenge
of achieving growth while adhering to the spirit in which the
nation was born, it could "employ science and technology in
the interests of all humanity and be truly worth of
emulation" . 9i
93The Economist (March 4, 1989), p. 34




US SECURITY AMD THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
India occupies a geographic position of particular
strategic value for any nation interested in Persian Gulf oil
or in Indian Ocean power projection or trade. United States
interest in the region dates from WWII and has been intense
throughout most that time. Curiously, though, US interest in
the major regional power, India, has not.
In the early 1950s, the United States allied itself with
India's enemy, Pakistan, thus gaining as an ally an Islamic
state. The geostrategic value of Pakistan is high, as it lies
close to the Persian Gulf, but the stability of this ally has
constantly been in question. The size, population, industrial
capacity, and economic progress and potential of Pakistan pale
in comparison to that of India. India is firmly committed to
secular democracy, whereas Pakistan is only now experimenting
with democratic ideals.
The US propensity since 1950 for zero sum strategic
thinking meant that US policy focused on Pakistan at the
expense of relations with India. Recent trends between the
United States, India, China and the USSR indicate an opening
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for improved US-Indian ties. Such a shift is considered not
only advisable but long overdue, and among various concomitant
benefits, would allow the United States to get out of the zero
sum India-Pakistan game. Even more critical is the potential
for stabilizing what threatens to become the newest nuclear
arms race area. Additionally, a new US approach to the Indian
Ocean would allow a much over-taxed US Navy to cut back on
resources currently committed to the Indian Ocean and Persian
Gulf region.
As of 1984, US and Indian diplomats have proved willing
and capable of carrying out the necessary political
arrangements for a detente. The focus here is on Indian Ocean
regional security, with a view toward improving stability and
securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) . A US-Indian
security agreement seems purely speculative at present, but
the two have overlapping national interests, as well as needs
and capabilities, that make such a relationship feasible.
This chapter examines India's military and strategic
situation, the Indian-Soviet defense relationship, the opening
of US-Indian defense ties, and the position of Indian in the
region , with all its implications for the Asian nuclear arms
race. Taken together, these factors point the direction for
a needed US policy shift.
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A. INDIA'S STRATEGY
An intrinsic fact that seems somehow to elude US policy
makers is that "the distinguishing characteristic in a medium
power's strategic aspirations is autonomy " ." For India
autonomy is an almost religiously fervent desire. Since
winning independence in 1947, India has made self-sufficiency
a national goal in political, economic and military terms.
Since, however, "medium powers are increasingly unlikely to
be able to sustain efficient armament industries offering a
comprehensive range of products, ...India, Japan and
Australia all make what they can and buy what they cannot." 96
For India, this search for defense equipment led eventually
to the USSR, which in turn led many in the United States to
assume the existence of a bond other than that of supplier to
buyer. One alarmist insisted in 1970 that the "first steps
had been taken for the ^integration' of the Indian military
95J. R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers





establishment with the Soviet." 97 Some Western alliance
members even went so far as to speculate in 1975 that "in the
event of a major crisis, it must be assumed that the Soviet
Union could execute a forward deployment . . . involving
dispatch of aircraft to Aden, India and Somalia." 98 In fact,
India tenaciously clings to leadership of the non-aligned
movement and has deliberately diversified its defense supply
lines to include France, Great Britain and the United States.
The Indian Navy is the leader in this effort, and is the
factor most critical for India's assertion of power in the
Indian Ocean.
India's navy historically has taken a back seat to the
army and air forces, but the 1971 war with Pakistan "proved
to be a watershed as far as the fortunes of the Indian Navy
were concerned." 99 In that war India "sought to deny the sea
approaches to East Pakistan to all Pakistani shipping, and
"Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), p. 212.
98Patrick Wall, ed., The Indian Ocean and the Threat to
the West (London: Stacey International, 1975), p. 26.
"Ravindra Tomar, "Development of the Indian Navy: An
Overstated Case?" (Canberra, Australia: The Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, September 1980), p. 26.
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apparently succeeded." 100 This seeming success focused
attention on the Navy, leading to a debate over what type of
strategy, and thus fleet, should be pursued. The fact that
India was "no longer faced with the task of disrupting lines
of communication between East and West Pakistan" was a strong
argument against purchasing large surface ships. 101 Others saw
the need for a ^balanced; fleet, to protect Indian shipping
and to develop the ability to attack Pakistan's vital maritime
interests (which would require large surface ships capable of
carrying some types of aircraft) . By the late 1970s, with
development of offshore oil resources and the New Economic
Zone concept becoming more important, a substantial increase
in capital outlay for the Navy "indicated that India had
decided to go in for the development of an ocean-going
fleet." 102 Another indication of this commitment was the
creation in 1978 of the Coast Guard, which would take over
some of the Navy's missions.
India's slow realization of the importance of maritime
strategy is probably due in great part to the fact that for
100 J. R. Hill, p. 141.
101Ravindra Tomar, p. 27
102 Ibid, p. 29.
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India, like Brazil, Mexico, the United States and the USSR,
seaborne exports made up less than ten per cent of the
national income through the 1970s (while for most of the
world's top thirty economies seaborne exports account for more
than ten percent). 103 In a 1978 study, India's sea dependence
rating was 3.4, as compared to the United States at 6.4 and
Japan at 9.2. 104 That rating is expected to climb, though, as
countries like Brazil and India make a conscious effort to
look outward and make use of the oceans. India's economy has
become noticeably more export-oriented in the past decade.
As Indian maritime strategy evolved in the 1980s, the
nation's maritime interests were loosely defined as: 1) the
need to protect Indian independence from threats via the sea,
2) to expand India's capabilities to exploit the mineral and
fish resources of the seabed, 3) to protect the growing
seaborne trade (especially for energy and high tech imports,
and for exports of agricultural and industrial products) , and
finally, 4) to promote influence in the littoral region. 105
103J. R. Hill, p. 30
104 Ibid, p. 42.
105Ashley J. Tellis "The Naval Balance in the Indian
Subcontinent", Asian Survey (December 1985), p. 1191
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India has given its navy priority during the past decade,
adding a second British aircraft carrier, West German
submarines, French Mirage-2000 aircraft and building a West
German maritime patrol/transport aircraft. The aircraft
carriers naturally are equipped with British Harriers and Sea
King helicopters. The Navy also has 15 British frigates, and
only 12 Soviet. 106 India also has commissioned for at least
five new Indian-built ships. 107
While India's strategy was taking shape, several
international events also had major impact on the Indian Ocean
region and military buildup there. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 led Western countries to increase policing
of vital sea lanes for oil from the Persian Gulf. Also in
1979 was the Islamic revolution in Iran and the ensuing
Iranian-Iraqi conflict. Superpower presence was increased on
both sides as the United States upgraded Diego Garcia and
sought additional South West Asian ports, while the USSR
acquired access to Socotra, the Dahlak archipelago, Massaua
and Assab. For the Indian Navy, the result of these events
106The Military Balance , International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1986-87, pp. 156-157.
107Howard Handleman, "Dangerous Race with Pakistan",
Pacific Defense Reporter (July 1988), p. 27.
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was a "serious alteration" from a sea control/shore defense
navy aimed mostly at Pakistan, to a power projection
orientation, which would serve to deter or at least raise the
threshold of naval interdiction. 108
The "central dilemma" for a medium power is "the mismatch
between what one would like to be able to do as a nation-
state, a strategic entity, and what one's resources will
allow." 109 Thus, India has had to tailor its power projection
orientation from a traditional multi-carrier battle group navy
to one of smaller, more diverse platforms.
The four missions to which the Indian Navy aspires are:
1) maritime surveillance of alien navies, 2) presence and
show-the-flag, 3) minimal deterrence, and 4) power
projection. 110 Maritime surveillance is the simplest and
cheapest of the four, and is a prerequisite for the others.
For India this is accomplished with five Super Constellations
and three IL-38 Mays.
The minimal deterrence mission is the backbone of the
Navy. This is a low-cost method for defending national
108 Ibid, p. 1192.
109J. R. Hill, p. 219.
110Ashley J. Tellis, p. 1193
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itime interests. /Indi<mar dia recognizes that it cannot hope for
complete domination in every type of conflict. Rather, it
chooses to convey the idea that the costs of engaging in
conflict with India would be prohibitively high. The recently
retired chief of staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral Tahiliani,
stated that although the Indian Navy could not ultimately
prevail against the force of a superpower, "we can raise the
cost of the intervention." 111 By thus excluding outside powers
from the region, India can assure itself of power projection
within the region, even without the traditional carrier battle
group formation. 112
Chart I provides a breakdown which, according to US
officers Jerrold F. Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezel, explains
India's view of its role in the Indian Ocean. 113 This
demonstrates the potential scope of Indian naval and air
inSubhash Chakravarti, "India's Nuclear Submarine Lifts
Local Arms Race" (London: London Times , 10 January 1988), p.
A12.
112The lack of traditional carrier battle groups and naval
infantry is seen by Tellis to mean no power projection
capability for India; here it is argued that regional power
projection is possible so long as the minimal deterrence
mission succeeds.
113Jerrold F. Elkin and Major W. Andrew Ritezel, USA, "New
Delhi's Indian Ocean Policy," Naval War College Review
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activities, including power projection throughout the Indian
Ocean
.
Within the subcontinent, India might ensure sea control
by destroying the Pakistani navy at sea or in its bases, by
blockading the Pakistani navy, or by destroying key Pakistani
installations using naval and air forces.
Blockading the Pakistani navy in its bases is not a
feasible option, since all Pakistani bases face contiguous
blue ocean, and an open ocean blockade would over tax Indian
surface forces and adversely affect its ability to perform
other duties.
Destroying the Pakistani navy in its bases was considered
optimal after this method was successful in the 1971 war. The
main reason it worked then, however, was Pakistan's lack of
retaliatory cruise missiles. With current Pakistani
capabilities, which include Harpoon surface-to-surface,
Sidewinder and Magic air-to-air, and Exocet air-tc-surface
missile, this option is no longer feasible. 114
Destroying key installations is considered plausible,
except that it requires coordination with the Indian Air
Force, an exercise not so far undertaken. Perhaps with proper
114The Military Balance, 1986-1987 (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 165.
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interservice training this option could be useful sometime in
the future.
The only way for India presently to defeat the Pakistani
navy, then, is to destroy it at sea, specifically in the
Arabian Sea. India probably has the capability to do this,
but would pay the price in terms of vessels and lives lost in
a protracted battle of attrition. It is also questionable
whether Pakistan would engage in such a battle, since it has
the advantage in a short war. 115 In fact Pakistan's naval
objectives vis-a-vis India are: 1) to use cruise missiles from
surface and subsurface platforms, denying India use of the
Arabian Sea, 2) to protect the Pakistani coastline and
territorial water, and 3) to conduct conspicuous attacks
against Indian shipping, offshore installations and coastal
targets. 116 Pakistan chooses to fulfill these needs using US
military and economic assistance, arguing that it can only
help the United States hold communism at bay so long as it can
115Pakistan has previously used the tactic, during a
period of diplomatic tension, of seizing the initiative by
launching a preemptive strike and then calling for UN
intercession and a cease fire advantageous to its own goals,
as in the 1965 subcontinent conflict. In fact this two-
pronged strategy is central to Pakistani defense planning.
116Ashley J. Tellis, p. 1202 (emphasis added)
.
69
also defend itself against its "giant" military neighbor and
enemy, India.
In fact "bean counting" has been used to justify US aid
to Pakistan, but comparing "the strong Indian numerical
strength obscures the disadvantages of possessing a partly
obsolete and highly heterogeneous fleet." 117 Pakistan's seven
modern attack submarines are smaller than India's Foxtrots but
are actually "more highly maneuverable and faster", and with
C
Harpoon, Pakistani subs "leave (India) at a relative
disadvantage." 118 So while the tactical naval balance
"presents a general impression of India superiority, it also
furnishes an interesting example of how technology can affect
the power relationships between asymmetrically sized
navies." 119 US defense officials should use caution in order
not to be taken in by this misleading tactic. 120
India has shifted its strategic focus from one aimed
narrowly at Pakistan to one encompassing the entire Indian
117 Ibid, p. 1197.
118Ibid, p. 1201.
119 Ibid, p. 1212.
120,An example of US military officers who do attach great
significance to "bean counting" can be found in Jerrold F.
Elkin and W. Andrew Ritezel, "The Indo-Pakistani Military
Balance," Asian Survey (May 1986), pp. 518-538.
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Ocean. Among littoral states with substantial navies on the
Indian Ocean, India has a strong numerical advantage, as seen
in Table I. A numerical comparison can be misleading, but is
at least indicative in this case of India's commitment to some
form of regional superiority. Only Pakistan represents any
real challenge to the Indian Navy, and, as discussed, the
viability of such a challenge is limited.
India has achieved maritime superiority versus any
littoral Indian Ocean state. This leaves only one or the
other superpower as a potential challenge or interventionist.





Indian Ocean Naval Powers
Saudi
Australia India Indonesia Pakistan Arabia
Total
Vessels 46 80 69 50 23
Aircraft carriers 2
Destroyers 3 4 8
Frigates 10 23 13 4
Corvettes 4 3 4
F.A.C. 14 8 24 12
Amphibiou 6 13 12 3
Patrol craft 21 9 31 5
Personnel 16 47 38 13 3.5
(xlOOO)
Source: The Military Balance, 1986-1987
Note: Figures for Australia represent totals, most of which
are not concentrated in the Indian Ocean.
Note: Pakistan has 30,000 contract personnel stationed in
Saudi Arabia (10,000), Libya, Oman, UAE and Kuwait.
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A. THE INDIAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
As previously mentioned, the relationship between India
and the USSR has been a main target of US interest in India.
Much has been made of this association, particularly as
concerns the Indian reliance on Soviet military equipment and
technology. Because of India's refusal to join in a 1950s
anti-communist alliance, the United States branded India as
a Soviet puppet or ally. The subsequent US arming of Pakistan
and refusal to reliably supply India (except for 1962 to 1965)
led to the Indo-Soviet relationship. This relationship has
been one of mutual benefit, but the gains for India are in
noticeable decline. The entire Third World has shifted its
agenda as decolonialization becomes less of an issue and
economic development takes precedence over political issues.
This has resulted in increasing criticism of the Soviet Union
"for failing to meet needs others than those related to arms
and security." 121 The United States must take advantage of
this opportunity to atone for past diplomatic mismanagement.
121Francis Fukuyama, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment
of the Third World (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1986),
p. 59.
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Understanding the real basis of the Indo-Soviet relationship
is central to correcting the situation.
As indicated in Chapter I, the Soviet Union initially
showed little inclination toward developing any relationship
at all with India. Under Stalin the mood toward India was
decidedly hostile; Stalin perceived India as merely a pawn for
Western big business and imperialism.
Khrushchev clearly recognized the value of befriending
such a large nation, even if it was firmly non-aligned. The
1955 visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was
a major affair, receiving extensive news coverage. The 1960
Sino-Soviet split and the 1962 Sino-Indian border war both
served to strengthen ties between India and the USSR.
A shift in Soviet policy became evident under new
leadership. Brezhnev decided to cultivate ties with Pakistan,
recognizing its geopolitical value, while still trying to
appease India. In January 1966, Soviet Premier Kosygin
invited Prime Minister Shastri (India) and President Ayub Khan
(Pakistan) to a meeting known as the Tashkent Summit. An
agreement was reached whereby each would withdraw forces by
February 25. After Shastri' s death in Tashkent, Indira
Gandhi assumed office and promptly visited President Johnson
in Washington. She followed this in July with a visit to
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Moscow, while Ayub Khan was working on an alliance with Chou
Enlai in the PRC.
Superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean began in the mid-
1960s. In 1965 Great Britain unilaterally declared the
existence of the British Indian Ocean Territory, comprising
four groups of islands, one of which was the archipelago that
included Diego Garcia. In 1966 the United States and Great
Britain signed an agreement that leased the island Diego
Garcia to the United States for fifty years. India responded
with understandable dismay over the apparent reassertion of
imperialism. The United States relocated the 1,200 natives
and established a communications and logistic support site. 122
In 1968 Great Britain decided to pull back all commitments
east of the Suez Canal. The perception of the resulting
vacuum helped India to begin seriously thinking of the Indian
Ocean as its own sphere of influence.
The Indo-Soviet twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship
and Cooperation was signed in 1971. The "immediate stimuli"
for this treaty were "the deepening crisis . . . caused by
Pakistan's civil war and, more important , the opening of the
122Larry Bowman and Ian Clark, eds . , The Indian Ocean in
Global Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981),
pp. 4 3-44.
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United States-China link accompanied by Washington's frank
communication that should China intervene in the subcontinent,
the US would be unable to support India as it had in 1962".
The treaty relates to defense only briefly since "both
governments were reluctant to commit themselves in advance to
specific actions of a military nature." 123
The treaty does commit them to "abstain from providing any
assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict
with other (sic) Party", and to consult whenever either party
is attacked. 124 Today that commitment continues, "rationalized
against the perception of a threat from US forces based at sea
and supported from Diego Garcia, within what India regards as
its natural ambit of power." 125 India's relations with the
USSR are the a result of American and British rejection in the
1950s and 1960s of India's defense requirements, and the
Indian perception in the late 1970s that the "chief hegemonial
threat" in the Indian Ocean was the United States. 126 India
123Richard F. Nyrop, ed., India: A Country Study
(Washington, D.C.: American University, 1985), p. 498
(emphasis added)
.
124Department of State Report 190-AR, "Soviet -Third World
Treaties Since 1971: Similarities and Contrasts", (August
1981), Annex B-3, Article 9.
125J.R. Hill, p. 68.
126 Ibid, p. 23.
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does not incline toward Moscow for ideological or political
reasons, and even economic and defense ties are now being
challenged.
The Indo-Soviet relationship was born of Western neglect,
and grew up on stubborn American insistence on a disavowal of
relations with communist states. Currently "cooperation in
traditional areas is no longer as appealing to Indian
planners" since the USSR "is not in a position to meet Indian
requirements for advanced industrial know-how." 127 The United
States is. in such a position, but has been painfully slow to
take advantage of this fact.
B. THE INDIAN-US RELATIONSHIP
The US relationship with India has mostly been one of
neglect and has often been negative, due to the US strategic
global zero sum thinking of the 1950s through the 1970s. From
the 1954 alliance with Pakistan in CENTO and SEATO, US arms
shipments to India's number one enemy were seen as a direct
threat to Indian security. In the 1962 border war with China,
the United States condemned Chinese aggression and supplied
127Rasul B. Rais, p. 127.
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some military aid to India. This was because the United
States remained unaware or unconvinced of the Sino-Soviet
split, and was therefore still eager to contain the PRC. But
in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan, the United States
pressured India to negotiate for a cease-fire line that was
to Pakistan's advantage, while the Soviet Union, at the
Tashkent Summit, worked out a plan to restore the original
state of affairs (more to India's advantage than the US
proposal)
.
US-Indian relations reached an all-time low when the
United States became "preoccupied with their initiation of a
new relationship with China" and so felt compelled to support
China's friend, Pakistan. 128 The US came to be seen as the
major security threat to India as it sent the aircraft carrier
USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. This attempt at naval
diplomacy failed miserably, merely exacerbating tensions and
not at all deterring India from its support of Bangladesh.
The US "record of heavy-footedness in small sea-based
conflicts . . . might (and, in this case, did) result in
unnecessary damage to relations between the parties." 129 These
128Richard F. Nyrop, ed., p. 490-491
129 J. R. Hill, p. 71.
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actions and the US failure to support the Bangladesh bid for
self-determination severely undercut US credibility in the
Third World and further infuriated India.
US preoccupation with Sino-American relations and the
failure of India to criticize the Soviet Afghanistan invasion
meant a continuation of troubled US-Indian relations. Then
the Reagan administration made clear in 1980 that a security
relationship with Pakistan was a top priority, a commitment
which translated into a $3.2 billion military aid package for
India's nearest and most bitter enemy. The continuing crisis
in Afghanistan and the US resolve to confront the Soviets
there through the muhajadeen gave improving Indian relations
a low US priority.
India and the United States seemed to be moving toward
improved relations when Indira Gandhi visited Washington in
1984. Although no substantive results of the visit with
President Reagan were forthcoming, this may have set the stage
for a serious US move in 1984. That year saw a "quite
remarkable" shift on the US side, as the administration
"launched a major initiative to forge new ties with India .
. . with an eye to building over time a significant military
supply relationship." This new interest in India "stem(s)
from its future power potential . . . (which) may give it in
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the next 10-15 years a sea denial capability in the
strategically important Arabian Sea." 130 Such a capability
could of course be used either to the benefit or detriment of
the United States and its interests there. "The point is not
that the US would be unable to get through (the Indian Ocean)
in extremis but that its political leadership might not
consider the political costs worth the political benefits." 131
The basis of the US policy shift was an October 1984,
National Security Council Decision Directive signed by
President Reagan, which "instructed all US Government agencies
to seek improved relations with India, and accommodate Indian
requests for dual-use technology". 132 A memorandum of
understanding (MOU) was also signed between the two nations
on the subject, which has been cited by Rajiv Gandhi as "an
important indicator of improved relations with the US." 133 The
MOU was intended to facilitate the transfer and/or sale of
dual use technologies; until this India "had been having a
130Dilip Mukerjee, "US Weaponry For India", Asian Survey
(June 1987)
, p. 595-596.
131Geof frey Kemp, "Maritime Access and Maritime Power, " in
Alvin J. Cottrell and Assoc, Sea Power and Strategy in the
Indian Ocean (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981).
132Nayan Chanda, "A New Indian Summer", Far East Economic
Review (25 February 1988), p. 34.
^International Herald Tribune , October 14, 1985.
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hard time obtaining licenses . . . given India's extensive
links with the Soviet Union." 134 In a less-than-overwhelming
assurance of support, Under Secretary of State Michael
Armacost claimed "there will now be a greater inclination to
approve, rather than deny (license applications)." 135 The
language may have been tempered but the results of the MOU are
clear: in 1983, 700 licenses were granted at a value of
$200,000, compared to 1985 with 4,300 cases approved at a
value of $1.3 billion. 136 Still, while US defense officials
were forced to give way to a shift at the policy-making level,
"the degree to which India should be accommodated is still an
open question within the Pentagon." 137
In June of 1985, Rajiv Gandhi and India's Defense Minister
visited Washington, including a meeting between Gandhi and US
Defense Secretary Weinberger. This was followed up by a
"high-powered delegation", led by India's Scientific Adviser
to the Defense Minister, which arrived in the United States
in August. During this visit Indian defense officials were
134Dilip Mukerjee, p. 601.
135Michael Armacost: "US Perspective on US/India
Relations", address at a Washington seminar, April 1986.
136Dilip Mukerjee, pp. 601-602
137 Ibid, p. 606.
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"shown a level of US military technology never before seen by
an Indian defense specialist." 138
The major defense sales resulting from the US policy shift
and subsequent US-Indian talks are the Cray XMP-14
supercomputer, the F404 jet engine, the F-18 avionics package,
and the LM2500 gas turbine engine (used for the Spruance class
destroyers) . The XMP-14 supercomputer sale was the "first .
. to a country outside the Western alliance, " indicating the
US realization of India's geopolitical significance and
India's "willing (ness) to grow out of its total dependence on
Soviet arms." 139 Still the sale was approved only after "a
prolonged internal (US) debate which was resolved by
presidential intervention." 140 India is necessarily wary of
making deals with the United States, since the Arms Export
Control Act gives the Secretary of State the authority not
only to "change conditions (of a contract) retrospectively"
but also to refuse to refund down payments made by India if
the US does decide to terminate. 141 Rajiv Gandhi has made
138Stuart Auerbach, "India to Get High Tech US Goods",
Washington Post , October 15, 1985.
139Nayan Chanda, p. 34.
140Ibid.
141Dilip Mukerjee, p. 603-604.
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clear his apprehension, describing the US propensity for
changing conditions of a deal retrospectively and thereby
cutting off the supply of spare parts. 142
The recent emphasis in India on diversification "worried"
the Soviets, and led them to make India "an offer they
couldn't refuse" on the MiG-29s. 143 This deal meant that India
received the top-of-the-line fighter before any Warsaw Pact
nation. While India's eagerness for this aircraft was
arguably a response to Pakistan's acquisition of the US F-16,
some US defense officials again made inferential leaps about
the Indo-Soviet relationship. Several major issues in fact
divide India and the USSR. It is in these areas that
opportunities for the US exist and should not be overlooked.
The US relationship with India has depended almost
entirely on US cold war strategy, and on the perception of
Indian ties to the Soviet Union. This interconnection must
be reexamined if US-Indian relations are to improve.
142Washinqton Post , June 14, 1985.
143Leo R. Wollemburg, "What's in it for India?" (National
War College, Strategic Studies Report, 1985), p. 23.
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C. INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1990S
US policy for the Indian Ocean has also been a reflection
of global superpower rivalry. Entering the 1990s, the United
States must formulate a new policy that concentrates more on
regional issues, stressing the need for regional stability in
order to best serve US interests.
South Asia has become a region of intense scrutiny as the
world apprehensively awaits the emergence of two additional
nuclear powers. India and Pakistan both possess the
technology for nuclear weapons and have imported weapons-grade
materials. The United States and the USSR have attempted to
check this development in both countries, without success in
either case. The region faces genuine peril from the
seemingly inescapable path to an open nuclear arms race.
Pakistan is in this competition because it concedes India's
conventional superiority and sees nuclear weapons as the only
way to challenge India. Pakistan could not have pursued
nuclear technology were it not for enjoying the spot as the
number three recipient of US aid since 1980 (after Israel and
Egypt) . In 1980 the United States might reasonably have
decided to risk South Asian nuclear proliferation rather than
lose Pakistan's acquiescence in smuggling arms to Afghanistan.
84
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan became final in
February of 1989, leaving Pakistan without benefit of an
immediate communist threat with which to ensnare the United
States
.
In 1987 a $4.2 billion aid package to Pakistan was
approved by President Reagan, using a presidential waiver to
retract sanctions imposed by Congress for blatant Pakistani
nuclear non-proliferation violations. In the same year the
House of Representatives' foreign relations committee voted
to cut aid to India from fifty to thirty million dollars, as
retribution for India's criticism of US policy in Nicaragua,
and India's refusal to allow international inspectors into
its nuclear power plants. India's "refusal (in 1979) to
accept Soviet-imposed safeguards on the supply of heavy water
was less publicized than the refusal to accept the extension
of American safeguards in 1980, but the attitude was similar
on each occasion." 1 * 4 Perhaps the blind spot of US policy
makers is due to the influence of Pakistan's $300,000 per year
lobbying firm, Neill and Co., which "devised a
strategy ... calling for an end to US aid and technology
'Timothy George, et al
. , p. 39
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transfer to India." 145 India has no public relations
counterpart to Neill and Co.
With Afghanistan no longer a critical bilateral issue, and
with the improvements in Indian-Chinese and US-Soviet
relations, an opportunity exists for the United States to
fashion a South Asia policy not dictated by cold war thinking.
As of 1985 the United States must certify annually a nation's
adherence to US non-proliferation laws prior to granting aid.
Since then, the Reagan administration has "quietly side-
stepped a tough decision on how to view Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program" on more than one occasion. But "intelligence
information on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has become
so voluminous" that the United States can no longer credibly
make the certification, and must impose sanctions on aid. 146
Fear of the Soviets becoming Pakistan's new ally and supplier
is unrealistic, especially in light of the Soviet's
frustrating experience in and withdrawal from Afghanistan and
its economic constraints.
The United States should now impose sanctions on the
generous, $4.2 billion 1987 aid package to Pakistan, until
145Far East Economic Review (25 February 1988), pp. 35-36.










such time as Pakistan provides real assurance that it has
halted its nuclear program. India will not disavow the
possibility of nuclear weapons so long as the PRC possesses
them. Still, with Pakistan constrained by US sanctions, the
tendency would be for India to show self-restraint. Further,
if India is openly recognized as a stable, democratic and
peaceful regionally hegemonic power and Pakistan is denied the
nuclear option, India would not view nuclear weapons as
immediately necessary. India could comfortably maintain
regional stability with conventional forces, particularly
after the current naval build up.
The key to disarming the South Asian nuclear arms race,
fco X Cf\
then is in US hands. \Af\L
An important area of Indo-Soviet tension is the Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace concept. The idea was first proposed
officially by Sri Lanka at the UN in 1971. The Soviets
envision a Zone of Peace maintained through a balance of power
among littoral states, a system similar to that advocated by
the United States. India is regionally dominant, however, and
will not willingly accept a less than predominant regional
role. The United States could take advantage of this Indo-
Soviet disagreement by encouraging India in its regional
dominance. For a stable democracy to prevail in the Indian
Ocean surely must coincide with US strategic interests. The
US stance so far has been to opt in favor of the balance of
power view, with the rearming of Pakistan and the US Navy
helping to maintain the balance. A shift is not risk-free,
but is considered an astute gamble. The cost of maintaining
the current US policy is in "reinforcing the existing
structure of Indo-Soviet relations." 147 Of any Indian Ocean
nations which might object to this US policy, Australia is
probably the only one that would have to be assuaged. Even
so, Australia may be satisfied with a South Pacific
domination, leaving the Indian Ocean region in the hands of
another stable democracy. Pakistan certainly would be
displeased by such a move, but recent developments point to
a more realistic assessment within that country of its role
in the region, as well as to a warming in its relations with
India (see Chapter V)
.
India most recently asserted itself as the keeper of South
Asia's stability when it crushed the attempted coup of the
Maldives on November 3, 1988. Indian troops have been
involved in Sri Lanka as well, helping to put down the Tamil
separatist movement since July 1987. Rajiv Gandhi was careful






to inform all members of SAARC (South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation) and the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi
of his intent to intervene in the Maldives (President Gayoom
of the Maldives had called for international assistance,
including the United States, Britain, India and Sri Lanka)
.
Neither the United States nor the USSR condemned India's
action; still, neither superpower has yet shown complete
support for India's new role. 148 The United States will gain
much by being the first superpower to do so
India's missile program has "moved in tandem with other
efforts to lay claim to being South Asia's regional
superpower." The newest addition to India's indigenous
capability is the Agni, an intermediate range missile
scheduled for test launch in May 1989. Some US senators saw
fit to criticize the launch, provoking Indian rebuttal. An
aide of Prime Minister Gandhi called the criticism
"ludicrous", saying "a nuclear missile is okay for China but
a conventional missile is not OK for India . . . Any self-
respecting Indian could not accept this." 149 US officials
148Rajendra Sareen and Manik de Silva, "Playing at cops,"
Far East Economic Review (17 November 1988), p. 15.
149Sheila Tefft, "India Steps up Arms Race," Christian
Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.: The Christian Science
Publishing Society, April 24, 1989), p. 1.
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should display more sensitivity in dealing with a regional
power.
Another issue sure to sow Indo-Soviet dissension is the
apparent Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The Soviet Union has long
"regarded India as a valuable asset in its competition with
China." 150 The current shift in Soviet policy only makes more
obvious the fact that India's value to the USSR is in its
dealings with the PRC. In May 1989 the Soviets and the
Chinese will meet in a summit, the first such diplomatic
meeting since the 1960 split. If the Soviets are willing to
decrease their forces along the Chinese border, real
rapprochement will in all probability follow. Closer
relations will be seen as threatening by India. A tangible
threat would be the troop movements, which would leave Chinese
forces free to address the Indo-Chinese border. Before the
Sino-Soviet split, India's threat perception was quite high,
as it saw a circle of foes from Pakistan to the PRC. The 1989
summit might bring back some of this threatened feeling. Some
opportunity may be awaiting the United States in this area.
1S0William Dunbar, "India in Transition", The Washington
Papers, No. 31 (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1976), p.
68.
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The United States should assure India that the USSR-PRC
rapprochement will be carefully monitored by the United
States, Japan and Korea. This posture is directly in line
with the US policy of containment and yet, since it requires
no direct peace-time action, would not offend India's sense
of non-alignment. India would then be free to pursue its
stated mission of patrolling the Indian Ocean in maritime
surveillance and power projection. The expectation cannot be,
however, to direct India's defense program or exert any other
overt influential action. A loose alignment would ensure that
India would not act against US interests. This is probably
the best short-term solution possible.
In addition to the Sino-Soviet Summit, 1989 will also
bring an international conference on the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace concept. In conjunction with the actions prescribed
above, the United States, by supporting India's position at
the conference, could further cement ties with India. To
resist India's hegemony would, at any rate, require a major
commitment of US personnel and resources. A US Indian Ocean
task force directed against India would face India's current
level of two aircraft carriers, 47 major surface combatant
ships, eleven submarines, nine patrol boats and 12 amphibious
ships, as well as the expected augment of 12 surface
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combatants, six submarines and nine patrol boats. 151 The other
way to challenge the Indian Navy would be through building up
Pakistan's navy. Both courses of action would force India to
look to the USSR and, in the worst case, perhaps join in a
USSR-PRC alliance. Additionally, either option would provoke
severe reaction from India, while also exacerbating regional
tensions (there also exists doubt concerning the reliability
and professionalism of Pakistan's navy).
Accordingly, the United States must recognize Indian
leadership. Doing so will make India more receptive to the
United States. If US and Indian interests overlap, the United
States can be quite comfortable in knowing that India will not
jeopardize those interests and would, in fact, go a long way
toward protecting them. In the Indian Ocean, this mean open
SLOCs and free trade. The US Navy could remain in the Indian
Ocean in a forward deployed status, but the United States
should offer co-use of Diego Garcia with India. This
diplomatic initiative would include proclaiming the intent to
negotiate between Great Britain and India for transfer of the
island to India in 2012, when the lease expires. 152 The United
151The Military Balance, 1986-1987 (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), pp. 154-155.
152Great Britain gave up claims to all other islands of
the so-called British Indian Ocean Territory (so named in
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States and Great Britain currently use the island jointly; for
a member of the British Commonwealth to join the operation
should not cause undue alarm. Such innocuous defense
cooperation sets a precedent for future joint operations or
training. Even the Soviets could not object to this
initiative too loudly, since it would meet with overwhelming
approval in India. It provides a way to transition to a new
security arrangement in a stable, peaceful manner. In
conjunction with US approval of India's new regional role,
implementation of such policy would clearly establish an
improved US-Indian relationship, and US Indian Ocean position.
It may lead ultimately to joint defense operations, and
improved US access to Indian ports and facilities.
The US policy shift made in 1984 was critically correct,
if late. The double standard long applied to communist China
and democratic India is proving glacially slow in lifting.
Perhaps the United States has learned a lesson from the
Soviets, whose "behavior in Asia has been pragmatic rather
*
1965), returning them to the Seychelles. The Chagos
archipelago, to which Diego Garcia belongs, was originally
part of Mauritius, but is closer to India. As with Hong Kong,
the British should prove willing to concede territories
claimed in the imperialist era.
93
than rigidly ideological." 153 Or it may be that the long-
heralded "one billion Chinese" population argument in favor
of relations with the PRC no longer carries as much weight,
since India will surpass China in terms of population by the
year 2025.
The decision to approve technology transfer requests to
India is important, but not enough. The 1984 to 1986
improvements have been overshadowed by the events of 1987.
The 1989 visit by President Bush to the PRC should have been
followed or preceded by a visit to India. The United States
must give India the political recognition it craves, including
recognizing and approving Indian hegemony in South Asia and
the Indian Ocean. Through such a strategy "India could be a
power that contributes to world stability as the US will see
it." 154 India's contribution would mean a lessening of the
burden on the US, specifically on the Navy, in helping to
maintain stability in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
153Robert C. Horn, "The Soviet Union and South Asia", in
Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski, The Soviet Union in
the Third World (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Univ. Press,
1987), p. 210.
154Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, as
quoted in Washington Post , May 4, 1985.
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VI. THE CASK TOR A US POLICY SHIFT
The benefits offered within the political arena represent
an opportunity for the United States to improve its position
in the international order. Failure to grasp this opening
with India will not automatically relegate the United States
to an untenable position in the world system. The consistent
refusal to acknowledge and respond to global changes which are
clearly taking place will work to this nation's detriment.
As a participant in the transition and in the new system
within the Indian Ocean, the United States will be better
prepared and more respected as it addresses change in all
areas of the world.
One of the risks involved in the policy shift advocated
hinges on the Indian-Soviet relationship. Some US defense
officials fear that any technology transfers or other
cooperative action with India would benefit the USSR. If
India had been encouraged in, rather than chided for, its non-
aligned stance in the 1950s, this issue would most probably
not exist today. Investigating the Indian-Soviet relationship
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is a valid pastime, but the evidence points to a decreasing
need for US concern.
In a 1982 study, Robert C. Horn concluded that "the
instances of the successful exercise of influence by either
(India or the Soviet Union on each other) have been rare,"
adding that "generally, such influence will likely remain
limited." 1" In 1987, Horn proposed that India has been the
primary focus of Soviet Asia policy since 1955, as evidenced
by the stable—though not always very close—relations. With
exception to the word primary, this author generally agrees.
Since Horn's work in 1982, however, the Soviet trend
toward the PRC has become more evident. Even over the past
thirty years, the PRC remained key in the minds of Soviet
leadership, who now are leaping eagerly at the chance for
rapprochement. The Indo-Soviet relationship cannot escape
repercussions from the new Soviet policy.
Gorbachev has made PRC relations a cornerstone of his
foreign policy. The Vladivostok speech of 1986 made clear the
Soviet recommitment to Asia, with special emphasis on China.
Addressing the 27th Party Congress in March 1986, Gorbachev
said he was pleased with "a certain amount of improvement
155Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and
Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), p. 213, 221.
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in. .. relations with its great neighbor— socialist
China . .
.
(and) reserves for cooperation between the USSR and
China are enormous ... (since) what is dearest to both peoples-
socialism and peace-is indivisible." 1" No specific mention of
India is made in the forty-page address, except to hint that
a rapprochement with the PRC will be made "without detriment
to third countries." 157
Relations with the PRC have assumed top priority for the
Soviets in Asia. A Moscow television show host claimed "we
are confident that... our future is determined by a community
of fundamental interests, of the Soviet Union and the PRC." 158
In describing his November 1986 visit to India, Gorbachev
stated "the main result of this visit... (is that) it has made
it possible to augment the potential for friendship and
cooperation between the USSR and India", adding that "we are
all-the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan-neighbors". 159 The
International Observers at the Roundtable program stressed
156The Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XXXVIII,
No. 8, March 26, 1986, p. 8.
157 Ibid.
158FBIS, USSR, Moscow Television Service, 29 December
1986.




that ties to India do "not mean that (the Soviet Union)
cooperates with just one state and cooperates less with
others. On the contrary , we have a wide range of partnerships
in Asia, and Soviet-Indian relations are indeed a model of
such mutual relations. Therein lies the value of Soviet-
Indian relations ". 160 Apparently, then, the Soviets value
India mostly for its extrinsic worth.
The May 1989 Sino-Soviet Summit may produce more tangible
evidence of the rapprochement. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnazdze traveled to Peking for talks with Deng Xiaoping,
Premier Li Peng and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in February
1989. The meetings produced the expected Sino-Soviet summit
plans, and a joint communique on Cambodia as well. China
apparently is "keen to show its support for ... Gorbachev's
new economic and social reform programmes." 161 Still,
Shevardnadze's visit was received by "hospitable but
restrained" hosts in Peking, as the PRC "stressed that Sino-
Soviet relations will not be the same as those of the
160FBIS, Moscow Domestic Service, 7 December 1986,
emphasis added.
161Tai Ming Cheung, "Push to the Summit," Far East
Economic Review (9 February 1989), p. 20.
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honeymoon years of the 1950s." 162 Plans to reduce Soviet
troops along the Sino-Soviet border are underway and should
be completed within two years. Along with the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, then, the three Chinese sticking
points for detente seem to be close to resolution (certainly
the summit would not be scheduled if a major difficulty
remained) . The potential exists, then, for the reforms of
both communist giants and their ideologies to bring the two
into a loose alliance. According to Robert Manning, both
economic and ideological reforms in both nations have served
to disintegrate differences between the PRC and the USSR, and
will be an "important unifying force." 163 So long as US-Soviet
relations remain stable, any broadening of USSR-PRC-India ties
need not be seen automatically as a threat to the United
States. The situation merits the closest possible
attention
.
Gorbachev and his reforms have shaken world Communist
parties, including the Communist Party of India-Marxist, which
comprised less then 5% of the Lok Sabha following the 1984
162Louise do Rosario, "Don't call me comrade," Far East
Economic Review (16 February 1989), p. 10.
163Robert A. Manning, Asian Policy: The New Soviet
Challenge in the Pacific (New York: Priority Press
Publications, 1988), p. 45.
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elections. 164 Safdar Hashmi of the CPI-M calls perestroika
"disturbing", especially since the CPI-M has "defend (ed) the
presence (in Afghanistan) of Soviet troops ... (but) now the
Soviets (are) saying they have no business to be there." 165
India continues to recognize the Soviet-backed Kabul regime,
even if the Soviets seem to be giving up. The ideological
ties between the small Communist movement in India and the
USSR are not significant, but represent another area of
potential disruption between the two nations.
Gorbachev visited India in December 1986 and again in
December 1988, but the moods of the two meetings were striking
in their contrast. The 1986 visit produced the Delhi
Declaration which "announced to the world that their global
interests now coincide more than ever before." 1" In 1988,
however, Gorbachev was "determined to keep the visit . . . more
low-key than the previous one"; a "subtle shift" was apparent
as India realized that "behind the diplomatic facade is the
undisputable fact that a Sino-Soviet rapprochement will, in
164Richard F. Nyrop, ed., India , p. 446.
165New York Times , January 24, 1989, p. A6
.
166
"The Second Honeymoon", India Today , December 15, 1986,
p. 45.
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no small measure, intrude upon New Delhi's relations with
Moscow . " 167
India certainly is not pleased with the prospect of losing
any Soviet trade, especially if it goes to a regional
competitor such as the PRC. More criti^al___wojaLd be Chinese
pressure to cut back on the military supply relationship, a
probably course since the PRC has close relations with
Pakistan, and views India as a competitor. Thus, even those
who have labeled India a Soviet client-state will be forced
to admit to an adjustment in the relationship. That change
allows for the US diplomatic dispatch prescribed herein.
Another aspect of risk involved in the policy recommended
is that US-PRC relations might suffer. The US policy of
normalizing relations with the PRC was meant as a powerful
addition to the strategy of containing the Soviet Union. With
Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the basis for that policy may no
longer be valid. Relations with the PRC certainly will remain
an important element of US policy, but should not impede
progress elsewhere. India and China both show some
determination to improve bilateral relations, meaning that the
167Bobb Dilip, "A Subtle Shift", India Today (December 15,
1988), pp. 14-15 (emphasis added).
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1
United States should not consider relations with the world's
two largest nations a zero sum effort.
Rajiv Gandhi visited the PRC in December 1988, the first
summit of Indian-Chinese heads of state since 1954. Since the
"Sino-Soviet thaw has eroded many of the reasons for animosity
between New Delhi and Peking, " the remaining dispute over the
border can now be addressed without the "mutual suspicion" of
the past thirty years. 168 Rajiv faces an intractable domestic
sector which views any territorial compromise as dangerous,
a betrayal of India's legitimate historical claims. Still,
he was able to set up a new joint working group, which is seen
as more realistic than the eight previous groups of border
talks. 1 * 9 This realism is seen by Rajiv's critics and
supporters as a distinct shift in Indian policy, one that will
allow bilateral cooperation apart from the border issue.
Improved relations between India and China are not seen
as a positive development by Soviet leadership. 170 The Soviets
continually stress the threat to India from China, Pakistan
and the United States, since it is this threat perception that
\
168Rita Manchanda and Robert Delfs, "Return to realism,"
Far East Economic Review (5 January 1989), p. 10.
169 Ibid.
170Leo R. Wollemburg, p. 33.
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has spawned the Indian-Soviet relationship. If that threat
is perceived as diminished, the basis for the relationship
also will be minimized.
Obstacles for a stronger Indian-US relationship include
continuing US-Pakistan military ties, and the inconsistency
of the United States as an arms supplier. Rajiv Gandhi has
addressed the US propensity for changing conditions of a deal
retroactively and thereby cutting off the supply of spare
parts. 171 US hesitancy is due to the fact that "the degree to
which India should be accommodated is still an open question
within the Pentagon." 172 Even while historical enmity
continues to aggravate Indo-Pakistani relations, a new
optimism has sprung from the "instant rapport" between Rajiv
Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, when they met at the December 1988
SAARC meeting. Both leaders are of the post-partition
generation and are unencumbered by "the bitter memories of
their elders." 173
Another political risk involved in the recommended policy
shift is in US relations with Pakistan. Pakistan need not
171Washinqton Post , June 14, 1985
172Dilip Mukerjee, p. 606.
173Salamat Ali, pp. 12-13
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suffer from Su^. « move; India has no territorial designs on
its neighbor (more Muslims live in India than Pakistan; this
fact alone should militate against any aggressive move on
India's part). Pakistan should now assume a realistic place
in US foreign policy. The inflated position it has enjoyed
because of the Afghanistan war is no longer valid. US
interests in Pakistan have deflated, although neither the
United States or Pakistan seems willing to admit this. The
United States should continue to provide moral and some
economic support for the administration of Benazir Bhutto.
US aid should be substantially decreased, at least to the
level of US aid to India ($50 million in 1987, and expected
to drop to $25 million in 1989)
.
A. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY
The US view of world stability must not remain rigidly
dogmatic, tied inflexibly to a bi-polar, anti-communist
paradigm. The world is leaving the post-WWII, containment
era; the US must not be perceived as overly reluctant in
entering a new one. Major power international actors are
emerging, such as Japan, India, Germany and Brazil; to ignore
this fact may leave the US estranged from the international
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system economically, politically and even strategically . T h
e
1980s watershed in the international system is evidenced most
pointedly by the following events or movements: 1) the cold
war between the superpowers seems to be ending;
2) Sino-Soviet relations are being at least partially
repaired; 3) the unilateral supremacy of the US in economic
and strategic power is decreasing relative to the increase
from new players; and, 4) Indian-Chinese and Indo-Pakistan
relations are leaving the post-war and post-partition era,
with a new realism apparent on all sides.
Since 1950, US foreign policy has been based on a
reactive, negative ideology, namely anti-communism. Following
this policy has "ensure (d) a reactive policy constrained by
the ideological blinders." 174 US officials have insisted that
communist states exporting revolution were the main threat to
Third World states. East-West confrontation has been central
to discussion of and policy toward nearly every Third World
state, either in propping up right-wing, authoritarian regimes
as a reward for not turning communist, or in the support of
anti-communist counter-insurgencies
.
174Peter J. Schraeder, "The Faulty Assumption of US
Foreign Policy in the Third World," in Ted G. Carpenter, ed.,
Collective Defense or Strategic Independence (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), p. 166.
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A critical inconsistency in US ant i -communism became
obvious in 1972. Suddenly the United States was befriending
a communist nation as President Nixon visited the PRC. Is it
possible, then, that the US government version of containment
has somehow transformed into the kind first envisioned by
George Kennan? That is, has US policy become anti-Soviet, in
a traditional balance of power sense, rather than anti-
communist, in its broad, ideological form? If this behind-
the-scenes transformation has happened, it somehow has failed
to impact US policy toward the Third World, a policy which
remains rigidly anti-communist/anti-revolutionary.
US policy toward Third World states has been "generally
unsatisfactory" due to a "woeful confusion of objectives." 175
Under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States has "oscillat (ed)
wildly" from security to ideological justification for
policies such as aiding the Nicaraguan or Afghanistan
rebels/insurgents. 176 US national security objectives must be
the first priority of any foreign policy. Since this is the
case, US officials should not attempt to justify policies on
175Ted G. Carpenter, "Benign Realism: A New U.S. Security
Strategy in the Third World," in Ted G. Carpenter, ed., op.
cit., p. 210.
176 Ibid, p. 214.
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a first premise use of ideology. The conflicts of security
in which ideological concerns do assume an equal role with
geopolitical issues should be explained as necessary for both
reasons. Clarification of US policies and the real rationale
behind them would promote a positive image of the United
States as a rational actor, rather than a negative image as
a moralizing bully. This is particularly true in the Third
World.
A second flaw in the rationale behind containment as an
security policy based primarily on ideology is that it does
not hold true in reverse. That is, US support for liberal,
democratic ideals is noticeably lacking compared to the
persistent and massive anti-communist effort. The United
States must accept the uncomfortable, and so far denied, fact
that "the projection of American values has a limited role in
US foreign policy." 177
US policy toward the Third World owes much of its failure
to former Secretary of State John F. Dulles. Dulles condemned
the principle of neutrality as "immoral", thus sentencing all
nations espousing non-alignment to US wrath, and creating
177Terry L. Deibel, "Neither with US Nor Against Us:
Revisiting an ^Immoral and Short-sighted Conception'," in Ted




*ant i -American sentiment. Rather than deleting non-alignment
from the globe, Dulles' virulent stance served only to enhance
the already anti-colonial/anti-Western tenor of the Non-
Aligned Movement. The perceived arrogance of the US
insistence on conformity to its anti-communism seriously
prejudiced Third World opinion. Dulles' equanimonous
acceptance and encouragement of "containment's world-splitting
tendencies" is puzzling since it actually made the world more
prone to dangerous crises, and committed the United States to
expensive, disadvantageous alliances. 178
The United States should now recognize non-alignment as
a respected, viable foreign policy. As the generally
acknowledged leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India would
accept such policy gladly. The resulting improvement in US-
Indian relations would allow for progress in the areas of
security and economy.
Secondly, US policy should shift to positive recognition
of Indian hegemony in South Asia and predominance in the
Indian Ocean.
Third, US businesses should be encouraged to actively
increase economic ties with India, thereby adding to the
178 Ibid, p. 201.
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incentive for improved relations and drawing India more fully
into the world market system. Aid to Pakistan should drop to
a reasonable level, and should be of a non-military nature.
The current aid package should be withdrawn until such time
as Pakistan seriously disavows the nuclear option.
Implementation of the policies recommended herein will
allow more flexibility in the US commitment to Indian Ocean
surveillance. It will dramatically improve the US image among
developing nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. It would
seriously impede any potential Indo-Soviet military
cooperation. It will serve as a potential power balance
against future Sino-Soviet cooperation. Finally, this policy
includes prospects for mending and strengthening relations
between the world's two largest democracies, an objective in
keeping with positive US ideological goals.
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